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The last year has been an explosive one in the tort arena. In lawyer
advertising, "Went For It" went for it, but the Supreme Court of the United
States did not. Defendants "discovered" more discovery from non-parties,
and an expert's expertise was expertly blocked when plaintiffs were barred
from seeking to obtain certain financial discovery from defendants' experts.
With regard to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, we learned that just
because you say it doesn't mean they get it. We were also educated on the
"fees"ability of obtaining attorney's fees, whether or not you had a
reservation. On bringing certain claims after they have previously been
adjudicated, the "res" is history.
The "Fabre monster" reared its ugly head, but two state supreme court
justices nearly stabbed it to death. The court took another bite out of dog
owners and warned physicians once again about the "duty to warn." We
learned that you don't always win with the "economic loss rule," and that
you still need to make an "impact" to succeed in certain tort cases. Another
court gave life to wrongful death cases involving a fetus. We were
informed that the "misuse" absolute defense is absolutely dead in products
liability cases. The Florida Department of Corrections learned that they
won't get away with an escapee getting away. With regard to the seatbelt
defense, we buckled down on buckling up, as Bulldog remained the big dog
in town. ",You got without having," as our supreme court eliminated the
need for permanent injury to recover in tort. We were told that absolute
immunity absolutely immunized a party in certain situations. Finding
voluntary dismissal different from an adjudication on the merits, we were
informed that just because you're done doesn't mean you're finished.
Although lawyers are talented people, they were unable in contribution cases
to make ten equal one hundred. Our supreme court stated that it is no
longer fairly debatable that it is fairly debatable, and we saw insurance
companies come out from hiding (behind defendants). We learned that you
should not "prejudge" the "interest"ing prejudgment development, and courts
expressed the vitality of implied covenants. We close with the punitive
warning that you may be damaged if you damage others.
II. PERSONAL INJURY SOLICITATION: "WENT FOR IT" CAN'T Go
FOR IT
Rules 4-7.4(b)(1) and 4-7.8(a) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar
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solicitation to victims or their relatives until at least thirty days following an
accident or disaster.! The rules also prevent a lawyer from accepting a
referral of a client that has been solicited in such a manner.2 The Supreme
Court of the United States in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.3 upheld this
restriction, finding that lawyer solicitation was commercial speech entitled
only to limited First Amendment protection.
4
The Court found that the restriction satisfied all three prongs of the
intermediate scrutiny test.5 More particularly, the Court reasoned that 1)
the Bar had a substantial interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of
personal injury victims and their loved ones against intrusive, unsolicited
contact by lawyers;6 2) the harms targeted by the prohibition were real,
1. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2"374 (1995). The rules at issue in
Florida Bar prohibited lawyers from soliciting victims, or relatives of victims, by means of
targeted direct-mail advertising for 30 days following a disaster or accepting a referral for
a client that had been solicited in such a manner. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-7.4, 4-7.8.
2. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2374.
3. Id. In March of 1992, G. Stewart McHenry, an attorney, and his lawyer referral
service, Went For It, Inc., claimed that the restriction of their direct-mail campaign was a
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments in their action for declaratory and
injunctive relief. Id. Before trial, another Florida lawyer, John Blakely, was substituted in
McHenry's place. Id. The district court entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs, and
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed based upon Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977),
and its progeny. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2374-75. The Court, however, noted that it was
"'disturbed that Bates and its progeny require[d] the decision' that it reached." Id. at 2375
(quoting Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038 (1 1th Cir. 1994)).
4. Id. In 1989, the Florida Bar completed a two-year study regarding the effects of
lawyer advertising on public opinion and determined that changes to the rules governing
lawyer solicitation were required. Id. at 2374. In 1990, the Supreme Court of Florida
adopted the Bar's proposed amendments. Id. (citing The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the
Rules Regulating the Florida Bar Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1990)).
5. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376-81. The three-prong test is taken from Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376. In Central Hudson, the Court stated that if
commercial speech is not misleading and does not concern unlawful activity, then it may be
freely regulated if: 1) the government asserts a substantial interest in support of regulating
the commercial speech; 2) the government demonstrates that the restriction directly and
materially advances that interest; and 3) the regulation is narrowly drawn. Central Hudson,
447 U.S. at 564-65.
6. The Court had "little trouble" finding a substantial interest for the Bar's regulation,
citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975), among others. Florida Bar,
115 S. Ct. at 2376.
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demonstrable, and sufficient to justify restriction of such speech;7 and 3) the
ban's scope was reasonably well-tailored to meet the stated objectives.8
The dissent9 asserted that the majority misapplied Shapero v. Kentucky
Bar Ass'n ° and that the three-prong test of Central Hudson was not
met." It found the first prong was not satisfied because the Shapero
case-which approved a similar form of advertising-was indistinguishable
from the case at bar.' The dissent asserted the second prong of Central
Hudson was not met either, in that the restriction on speech did not support
the state's asserted interest in a direct and material way. 3 Finally,
according to the four justices, the third prong was not met because "the
relationship between the Bar's interests and the means chosen to serve them
[was] not a reasonable fit.' ' 4
IL. DISCOVERY
A. "What's Up Doc?"
Reiterating the general discovery rule of nondisclosure of the names of
a private physician's patients who are not parties to the action, the First
7. The Court distinguished Edenfeld v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993), finding that
contrary to the 106-page study proffered in Florida Bar, the State Board of Accountancy in
Edenfeld had presented no studies in support of its regulation. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at
2377. In fact, the Court found "the only evidence in the record tended to 'contradic[t] rather
than strengthe[n] the Board's submissions."' Id. (quoting Edenfeld, 113 S. Ct. at 1801).
Therefore, the Court invalidated the regulation banning in-person solicitation by C.P.A's.
Id.
8. Id. at 2380. The 30-day waiting period was not overly restrictive and numerous
alternatives exist to direct-mail solicitation in order for injured parties to become aware of
legal representation. Id. However, the Court admitted it may have had greater difficulty in
upholding the Florida Bar rules had the restriction not been limited to a brief period, and if
other ways to learn about the availability of legal representation had not existed. Florida
Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2380.
9. The dissenting opinion was authored by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsberg. Id. at 2381.
10. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
11. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2382-86.
12. Id. at 2382-83. The dissent's principal disagreement in this regard was based on the
finding in Shapero that direct-mail advertising was not "overreaching and undue influence."
Id. at 2382.
13. Id. at 2383-84.
14. Il at 2384. The dissent described the Florida Bar's rule as a "flat ban" which
prohibited more speech than necessary to achieve the state's purported interest. Florida Bar,
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District Court of Appeal in Staman v. Lipman 5 held that non-party patients
have a privacy interest in not having their names revealed in a medical
malpractice action." The court reasoned that the names of the non-party
patients of the private physician are not relevant to 1) whether the defendant
physician obtained informed consent from the plaintiff or 2) whether he
deviated from the community standard of care while treating the plaintiff. 7
In refusing to allow discovery of the doctor's sign-in logs in Staman, the
court distinguished Big Son Health Care Systems, Inc. v. Prescott,8 on the
basis that the discovery of hospital records (i.e., emergency room sign-in
records) in that case were subject to limited disclosure by statute.'
Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Amente v. Newman,
20
held Florida Statutes section 455.241(2) inapplicable to requests for
complete medical records, as long as those medical records are properly
redacted so as to protect the patient's identity.2" The court found no
violation of the patients' rights of privacy where all identifying information
15. 641 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Staman concerned sign-in logs from
a physician's private office, where disclosure of the patients' names would not only violate
those non-party patients' privacy interests but allegedly would cause irreparable injury to the
physician's professional reputation. Id. at 455.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 582 So. 2d 756, 758 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding hospital sign-in logs
containing limited information are discoverable because patients listed on them have no
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the logs since any other patient who signs
in could view the names of patients who signed previously).
19. Staman, 641 So. 2d at 454-55 (citing Prescott, 582 So. 2d at 758). Chief Judge
Zehmer dissented, asserting that there was no privacy interest in allowing disclosure of the
names appearing on the "sign-in" log, as they were "open and available for inspection by all
persons who signed in at the doctor's office on a given day." Id. at 455 (Zehmer, J.,
dissenting).
20. 653 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1995).
21. Id. at 1032
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was eliminated,' but conceded that there may be circumstances where the
privacy of one's medical records would be constitutionally protected.23
22. ld. at 1033. The court approved Amisub, Inc. v. Kemper, 543 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1989), and Ventimiglia ex reL Ventimiglia v. Moffit, 502 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1986), but expressly disapproved the following cases: Leikensohn v.
Cornwell, 434 So. 2d 1030, 1030-31 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding medical
malpractice defendant could not be compelled to answer interrogatory which requested non-
party patient's initials, date of surgery, and name of hospital where surgery was performed);
North Miami Gen. Hosp. v. Royal Palm Beach Colony, Inc., 397 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding hospital was not required to answer interrogatory
concerning hospitalization records of patients not involved in the suit because this would
"impermissibly compromise their right to the confidentiality of their medical records");
Teperson v. Donato, 371 So. 2d 703, 704 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding order
requiring production of non-parties' medical records was error because the question of
medical malpractice is whether the doctor used a standard of care commensurate with that
used in the community, and this question can be answered by methods other than invading
the medical records of strangers); and Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Peralta, 358 So. 2d 232, 233
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) (holding order requiring production of medical records and
photographs of non-parties was in error because "to permit a party to inject into the public
record medical information of a stranger to the suit, under the guise that it has a bearing on
the competency of the doctor, would be unconscionable"), cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 889 (Fla.
1978).
23. Amente, 653 So. 2d at 1033. The impact of this decision is evident in Bassette v.
Health Management Resources Corp., 20 Fla. L. Weekly D1938 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. Aug.
23, 1995). In this case, the plaintiff alleged she suffered physical and psychological injuries
from the purchase and consumption of a powdered diet food product. Thereafter, the
respondent, Health Management, sought and was granted non-party discovery of the medical
records of Dr. Bassette, the father of the plaintiff, on the basis of its assertion that such
discovery would be useful in confirming whether there is a history of depression or other
mental illnesses in plaintiff's family. Id. at D1938. The Second District Court of Appeal
held that "T]ust because one family member files a lawsuit that places her medical condition
at issue does not mean that the medical history of her entire, or even immediate family,
becomes relevant for discovery purposes." Id. For another case addressing the issue of the
disclosure of a non-party's medical records, see In re Fink, 876 F.2d 84, 85 (1 1th Cir. 1989)
(applying Florida law in granting writ of mandamus to prohibit the discovery of medical
records of non-parties, also stating that "[t]he Florida courts have consistently refused to
permit discovery of the medical records of non-parties to an action"); accord Dierick v.
Cottage Hosp. Corp., 393 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that although
medical records relating to the patient's siblings might have been relevant to the defendant's
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B. A Prescription for Compulsion
A plaintiff can be compelled to sign, execute, and deliver medical
authorization forms to the defendant so as to allow the defendant to directly
obtain the plaintiffs out-of-state medical records. In Rojas v. Ryder Truck
Rental, Inc.,24 the plaintiffs, residents of Massachusetts, sustained injuries
in an auto accident that occurred in Florida. The plaintiffs filed suit
seeking damages for their injuries and for aggravation of other previously
existing medical conditions.26 When the defendant was unsuccessful in
obtaining discovery of the plaintiffs' Massachusetts medical records, they
petitioned the court to compel such discovery.27 The court's ruling
required the plaintiff to execute a blank medical authorization form, without
requiring the defendants to institute a separate action in Massachusetts. 2s
The court apparently treated the Massachusetts medical providers like
Florida residents, reasoning that this discovery method provided the most
practical and least burdensome method for obtaining the records, in that
neither party should be placed in a different position or be prejudiced just
because a medical facility is located out-of-state.29 The court also noted
that the out-of-state medical records requested by the defendants were "non-
24. 641 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1994).
25. Id. at 856.
26. Id. During discovery, the defendants attempted to obtain the plaintiffs' medical
records using subpoenas filed pursuant to rule 1.351 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. However, the medical facilities in Massachusetts, where the plaintiffs were treated,
refused to supply the records. Id.
27. Rojas, 641 So. 2d at 856.
28. Id. at 857.
29. Id. The court stated that "[i]t makes no sense to impose a more costly and time-
consuming discovery process on the seeking party solely because the medical providers are
located out-of-state. The rules . . .do not prohibit judges from using their discretion to
fashion an appropriate remedy to obtain out-of-state records." Id.
Vol. 20
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privileged, potentially relevant, and discoverable documents., 30  In so
holding the court harmonized Rojas with Johnston v. Donnelly31 and
Reinhardt v. Northside Motors Inc.
32
C. An Expert's Expertise Expertly Protected
Finding oppressive and burdensome the discovery relating to indepen-
dent medical examinations performed by an expert, the Third District Court
of Appeal in Syken v. Elkins33 prohibited discovery of information relating
to 1) the defendant expert's income amount received from testifying, as well
as 2) the total number of independent medical examination performed in this
regard.34 During discovery in Syken, the plaintiff's counsel requested that
the defendant's expert witness produce documentation of the income the
expert earned from independent medical examinations since January 1,
1990."5 The court found that "[t]he production of the information ordered
...causes annoyance and embarrassment, while providing little useful
information ' '36 and, therefore, discovery could be limited.37 Although
recognizing conflict with prior decisions and other district courts, the court
30. Id. The supreme court added that it made no sense to burden the seeking party with
a discovery process which requires more time and money just because the medical providers
are out-of-state residents. Rojas, 641 So. 2d at 857; accord Kennedo v. U.S., No. CV-94-
2552, 1995 WL 428660, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 1995) (holding it was inappropriate for
plaintiffs attorney to interview treating psychiatrist employed by medical negligence
defendant without defendant's consent).
31. 581 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding execution of a blanket
medical authorization release will not allow for disclosure of medical records).
32. 479 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (denying request for execution of a
medical release where the requesting party had made no known attempts to get the medical
records by any other means). One wonders whether a party may use this case in other ways
for the purpose of bypassing the requirements of another state's regulations.
33. 644 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
34. Id, at 544-45.
35. Id at 541. Apparently, the plaintiffs counsel sought these documents in an effort
to demonstrate the bias of defendant's expert witness.
36. Id at 545.
37. I1d Discovery of relevant, non-privileged information may be limited or prohibited
in order to prevent annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. FLA.
R. Civ. P. 1.280(c), 1.410(b), 1.410(d)(1); see also South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v.
Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); cf Crandall v. Michaud, 603
So. 2d 637, 639-40 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (limiting the holding to its facts, the court
said an independent medical examining doctor was not required to reveal the reports of
medical examinations of patients other than plaintiff, as such disclosure was unduly
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established new guidelines" regarding discovery of an opposing medical
expert for impeachment purposes.39
38. Syken, 644 So. 2d at 546. Under the new guidelines, discovery of an opposing
medical expert (for impeachment) is limited by the following criteria:
1. The medical expert may be deposed either orally or by written
deposition.
2. The expert may be asked as to the pending case, what he or she has
been hired to do and what the compensation is to be.
3. The expert may be asked what expert work he or she generally does.
Is the work performed for the plaintiffs, defendants, or some percentage of each?
4. The expert may be asked to give an approximation of the portion of
their professional time or work devoted to service as an expert. This can be a
fair estimate of some reasonable and truthful component of that work, such as
hours expended, or percentage of income earned from that source, or the
approximate number of IME's that he or she performs in one year. The expert
need not answer how much money he or she earns as an expert or how much
the expert's total annual income is.
5. The expert may be required to identify specifically each case in
which he or she has actually testified, whether by deposition or at trial, going
back a reasonable period of time, which is normally three years. A longer
period of time may be inquired into under some circumstances.
6. The production of expert's business records, files, and 1099's may
be ordered produced only upon the most unusual or compelling circumstance.
7. The patient's privacy must be observed.
8. An expert may not be compelled to compile or produce nonexistent
documents.
Id.
39. Id. at 544-45. The court noted support for its conclusion. Id. at 544; see LeJeune
v. Aikin, 624 So. 2d 788, 789 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (Schwartz, C.J., concurring
specially); Trend South, Inc. v. Antomarchy, 623 So. 2d 815, 816 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.)
(Jorgenson, J., dissenting) (finding that the trial court's order compelling expert witness to
provide information on tax returns and other sources of income was an unreasonable "fishing
expedition"), review denied, 630 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1993); see also Ex parte Morris, 530 So.
2d 785, 787 (Ala. 1988); Allen v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 198 Cal. Rptr.
737, 741 (Ct. App. 1984) (explaining that lower court abused its discretion when it required
medical expert to produce documents that may have been obtained through less intrusive
means); Jones v. Bordman, 759 P.2d 953, 964 (Kan. 1988) (stating that if sole purpose of
discovery request is to obtain evidence which could impeach witness' veracity, then
information is not discoverable, especially when party could have acquired evidence through
less obtrusive means); Ede v. Atrium S. OB-GYN, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 365, 368 (Ohio 1994)
(holding evidence of common insurance interests among defendant and expert witness is
sufficiently probative of expert's bias to outweigh any prejudice evidence might cause);
Mohn v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hosp., 515 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986);
Russell v. Young, 452 S.W.2d 434, 435 (Tex. 1970) (reasoning that non-party witness'
records are not discoverable prior to trial if sought for purposes of impeaching witness).
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D. Just Because I Said It Doesn't Mean You Get It
A party's right to invoke the psychotherapist-patient privilege does not
necessarily terminate because others are aware that the party was receiving
treatment.' In Yarborough v. Lewis,4 1 the Second District Court of
Appeal found the defendant's right to invoke the psychotherapist-patient
privilege was protected, notwithstanding that plaintiff admitted during a
deposition that his family, physician, associates, office staff, and some
friends were aware of his hospitalization.42 The court distinguished H.J.M.,
M.D., P.A. v. B.R.C. & R.H.C.,43 a case that found a waiver can occur
through disclosure, finding it not to be controlling where a party consistently
and frequently asserted the privilege prior to complying with any court
order."
E. You Can't Party on a Non-party
The Department of Insurance is not considered a "defendant" for
purposes of service under rule 1.070 of the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
40. Yarborough v. Lewis, 652 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994). But see Nelson
v. Womble, 657 So. 2d 1221, 1222 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that there is no
privilege for discovery of psychological records where mental and emotional condition is at
issue); Castillo-Plaza, M.D. v. Green, 655 So. 2d 197, 200 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(explaining statutory privilege of doctor-patient confidentiality does not apply in a medical
negligence action where a health care provider is or reasonably expects to be named as a
defendant). The Castillo-Plaza court reasoned that even if the statutory privilege under §
455.241(2) applied, the trial court could not preclude ex parte conversations between defense
counsel and the plaintiff's non-party treating physician on unprivileged subjects by restricting
counsel to formal discovery. Castillo-Plaza, 655 So. 2d at 202.
41. 652 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
42. Id at 835. In Yarborough, the defendant was being sued for medical malpractice
arising out of a surgery. The plaintiff never alleged that the defendant's negligence or failure
to obtain the patient's informed consent was the result of the defendant's impairment due to
drugs or alcohol. Nevertheless, the plaintiff attempted to obtain any information relating to
defendant's drug and alcohol abuse through interrogatories and production requests. During
the defendant's deposition, he admitted having been treated at a medical facility for alcohol
use for one month in 1991. Id. at 834.
43. 603 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 613 So. 2d 834 (Fla.
1992).
44. Yarborough, 652 So. 2d at 835. In H.J.M., the defendant admitted to participating
in a substance abuse program while being deposed. H.J.M., 603 So. 2d at 1332. The First
District Court of Appeal concluded the defendant had "effectively waived the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege" because he provided part of the information ordered disclosed by the
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dure. In Turner v. Gallagher,45 the court defined "defendant" as "a party
named in a lawsuit against whom some type of relief or recovery is sought
or who claims an interest adverse to the plaintiff."46 Since the Department
of Insurance in Turner was not named as a "defendant," it did not have to
be served with process within 120 days of the filing of the initial com-
plaint.47 The court also found that chapter 768 does not require the
Department of Insurance to be made a "party" to an action, presumably
because relief in such cases is not sought or obtained from the Depart-
ment.48
IV. OFFER OF JUDGMENT & AT'rORNEY'S FEES
Originally, there were two statutory sections and one rule governing a
party's right to obtain an award of attorney's fees from a rejection of an
offer to settle: 1) section 768.79;49 2) section 45.061;5" and 3) rule 1.4-
42.51
The defendant who files an "offer of judgment" under section 45.061
which is not accepted within thirty days52 may recover attorney's fees if
the judgment is of no liability 3 or at least 25% less than the offer.14 The
45. 640 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
46. Id. at 121. The defendant, Sheriff Walter J. Gallagher, moved to dismiss the
plaintiff's complaint, alleging they had failed to serve the Department of Insurance within
120 days after filing of the complaint, as required by § 768.28(6)(a) of the Florida Statutes.
Id.
47. Id. at 121-22. The Fifth District Court of Appeal certified conflict with the First
District Court of Appeal, which decided Austin v. Gaylord, 603 So. 2d 66 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.
App. 1992).
48. Turner, 640 So. 2d at 121-22. The court concluded that merely serving someone
with process does not make them a defendant, and even a strict application of the 120-day
rule could not make it applicable to an entity that is not a "defendant." Id. at 123.
49. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1993), entitled "Offer of Judgment and Demand for
Judgment."
50. FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1993), entitled "Offers of Settlement."
51. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442. Rule 1442 was repealed in 1992, and parties are now
directed to "comply with the procedure set forth in section 768.69 of the Florida Statutes
(1991)." Id.; see also Timmons v. Combs, 608 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1992) (adopting § 768.79 of
the Florida Statutes as the rule).
52. Cf Puleo v. Knealing, 654 So. 2d 148, 149-50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(applying the enlargement of time set forth for court-ordered mediation in § 44.102 of the
Florida Statutes, but certifying the question in light of Timmons of whether § 44.102
represented an unconstitutional intrusion into the rule-making authority of the supreme court).
53. Timmons, 608 So. 2d at 1. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Malmberg, 639 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1994), the Malmbergs sued the defendant, State Farm, to
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amount awarded is set off against the plaintiff's award. 5 If the fees and
costs exceed the amount awarded to the plaintiff, the court will enter a
judgment for the defendant less the amount of plaintiff's award. 6
Correspondingly, the plaintiff may receive attorney's fees if its "demand for
judgment" under section 768.79 is not accepted within thirty days and it
recovers at least 25% more than the demand.57 A court may deny such an
award if the offer was made in bad faith.
The two statutes differ in their application. A party may avail itself of
section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes and secure an award of attorney's
fees. 8 An award of attorney's fees under section 768.79 does not depend
on the "reasonableness" of the rejection." Once the requirements of
section 768.79 have been met, the offering party can be denied attorney's
fees only if the offer made was a "bad faith" offer.6 The nature, validity,
and enforceability of an offer are factors to consider when deciding whether
the offer was made in good faith.61
Contrary to section 768.79, section 45.061 allows a party to collect
attorney's fees after the court has made an express finding on the record that
the rejection of the offer was unreasonable. 6 - A defense verdict, under
recover damages under their uninsured motorist coverage. Id. at 615. After the Malmbergs
rejected State Farm's offer to settle, the case went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict
for State Farm. Id. at 616. Although the court agreed with the district court's finding that
the statutory presumption of. unreasonable rejection is not conclusive, it found no support
either in § 45.061 of the Florida Statutes or Timmons for the proposition that the
presumption should not apply to defendants' verdicts. Malmberg, 639 So. 2d at 616. The
court in Malmberg noted that § 768.79 grants defendants attorney's fees only on policies
issued or renewed after October 1, 1990, thus finding it inapplicable to the Malmberg's 1987
accident. Id. But see Pickett v. Tequesta Dev. Co., 639 So. 2d 1133, 1134 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1994) (holding pre-amendment version of § 768.79, which applied to these
plaintiffs, denied a defendant an award of fees where the judgment was of no liability).
54. Malmberg, 639 So. 2d at 616.
55. FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1993).
56. Id.
57. Id,
58. Accord Baker Protective Servs. v. F.P. Inc., 659 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1995).
59. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1993). The prerequisites of § 768.79 are a finding of no
liability and a judgment obtained by the plaintiff that is at least 25% less than the defendant's
offer of judgment. Id.
60. A court may not deny attorney's fees on the basis of the reasonableness of the
rejection. Government Employee's Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 641 So. 2d 189, 190 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1994).
61. Id.
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section 45.061, creates a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff must have
unreasonably rejected the defendant's previous offer of judgment.63 The
presumption of an unreasonable rejection present in Florida Statutes section
45.06164 applies even when there is a verdict for the plaintiff. The court's
holding in Malmberg 5 makes clear that the unreasonable rejection
presumption applies to defendants' verdicts as well as judgments for
plaintiffs.66
A. The "Res" Is History
A defendant who prevails on a motion for summary judgment based on
the doctrine of res judicata is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Florida
Statutes. In Olson v. Potter,67 the Second District Court of Appeal
determined that the plaintiffs failed to plead any justiciable issue of law or
fact because they attempted to litigate issues which had previously been
determined by summary judgment.68  The court thus awarded attorney's
fees pursuant to section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes.69
63. Henson v. Haslam, 644 So. 2d 1031, 1032 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994). The court
remanded for express findings that the plaintiffs rejection was "reasonable," thus rebutting
the presumption that the rejection is unreasonable when there is a verdict for the defendant.
Id.; see also Malmberg, 639 So. 2d at 616 (holding that the presumption of an unreasonable
rejection, present in § 45.061, applies even when there is a verdict for the defendant).
64. FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1993). Subsection (2) provides, in pertinent part:
An offer shall be presumed to have been unreasonably rejected by a defendant
if the judgment entered is at least 25 percent greater than the offer rejected, and
an offer shall be presumed to have been unreasonably rejected by a plaintiff if
the judgment entered is at least 25 percent less than the offer rejected.
Id.
65. Malmberg, 639 So. 2d at 616; see also Timmons, 608 So. 2d at 1.
66. Section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes which allows prevailing defendants to receive
attorney's fees, applies only to policies issued after § 768.79 was amended on October 1,
1990. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1993).
67. 650 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
68. l at 637.
69. Id. Section 57.105 allows the prevailing party to collect attorney's fees when no
justiciable issue of either law or fact is raised by either the complaint or defense of the losing
party. Id.; cf. Skubal v. Cooley, 650 So. 2d 169, 170 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that prevailing party entitled to fees under § 772.11 where plaintiff's claim lacked substantial
factual or legal support). As a result, it is not necessary to find a "complete absence" of
legal or factual support as provided in § 57.105. Id.
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B. Sometimes It's "Fees "able to Get a Table
Even without a Reservation
In Amlan v. Detroit Diesel Corp.70 and Wyatt v. State,7 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal reiterated the rule that, where you can meet the
"independent and collateral" test, you may proceed to recover on certain
motions, even if a notice of appeal has been filed.72 Determining that
motions to assess fees and costs as a sanction for discovery violations is a
collateral and independent claim, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
reiterated that a trial court has continuing jurisdiction to entertain a post-
trial motion once a notice of appeal is filed.73 There may even be times
where you can secure fees upon a motion made after judgment.74
C. Operation Lodestar
Agreeing with the Third75 and Fourth76 District Courts of Appeal, the
Supreme Court of Florida, in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley,
70. 651 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
71. 652 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
72. Wyatt, 652 So. 2d at 454; Amlan, 651 So. 2d at 706. This usually occurs in motions
directed to recovery of attorney's fees. The court in Amlan, however, found the trial court
correct in declining to consider the motion because the appeal dealt with the same discovery
sanctions. Amlan, 651 So. 2d at 706.
73. Wyatt, 652 So. 2d at 454; see also Roberts v. Askew, 260 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1972).
In Roberts, the court held that "costs may be adjudicated after final judgment, after the
expiration of the appeal period, during the pendency of an appeal, and even after the appeal
has been concluded." Roberts, 260 So. 2d at 494. "However, the motion to tax costs should
be made within a reasonable time after the appeal has been concluded." Id.; see also
Finkelstein v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 484 So. 2d 1241, 1243 (Fla. 1986) (finding that
post-judgment motion for attorney's fees raises "collateral and independent claim" which a
trial court has continuing jurisdiction to entertain within reasonable time, notwithstanding that
litigation of main claim may have been concluded with finality).
74. Tampa Letter Carriers, Inc. v. Mack, 649 So. 2d 890, 891 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (finding defendant's right to attorney's fees may not be "thwart[ed]" by plaintiffs
voluntary dismissal of its case); see also Ganz v. HZJ, Inc., 605 So. 2d 871, 872-73 (Fla.
1992) (holding that rule announced in Stockman v. Downs, 573 So. 2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1991),
that requires requests for contractual attorney fees, does not apply to § 57.105 of the Florida
Statutes). The court in Tampa Letter Carriers extended the supreme court's holding by
"conclud[ing] that the Ganz analysis applies to fee requests under section 768.79." Tampa
Letter Carriers, 649 So. 2d at 891.
75. Stabinski, Funt & DeOliveira, P.A. v. Law Offices of Frank H. Alvarez, 490 So. 2d
159 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 500 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1986).
76. Faro v. Romani, 629 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), quashed on other
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P.A. v. Polet, 77 held that the lodestar method for determining reasonable
attorney's fees does not apply to a fee dispute between a discharged attorney
and a former client, where the fee will be paid for by the client.78 The
supreme court in Searcy found the lodestar approach is "ill-suited for the
task of assessing attorney's fees due as damages for breach of an agreement
for the payment of fees because it does not allow for consideration of the
'totality of the circumstances surrounding the professional relationship.'
79
D. Section 57.105 May Be "Teething"
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, putting some bite in section 57.105
of the Florida Statutes, entered an order sua sponte directing the trial court
to assess costs and fees pursuant to section 57.105. In doing so, the court
in Brahmbhatt v. Allstate Indemnity Co.0 reiterated the standard for
determining a frivolous appeal:
A frivolous appeal is not merely one that is likely to be unsuccessful.
It is one that is so readily recognizable as devoid of merit on the face
of the record that there is little, if any, prospect whatsoever that it can
ever succeed. It must be one so clearly untenable, or the insufficiency
of which is so manifest on a bare inspection of the record and assign-
ments of error, that its character may be determined without argument
or research.81
E. You Gotta Know What You Have to Know What You Can Do
An order determining liability for attorney's fees is not an appealable
non-final order unless it determines the amount of the fee. As the court
noted in Winkelman v. Toll,82 "[r]ule 9.130 (a)(3)(C)(iv), [of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure] authorizes the appeal from non-final orders which
determine 'the' issue of liability, not 'an' issue of liability."83 Accordingly,
77. 652 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1995).
78. Id. at 368-69.
79. Id. (citing Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1022 (Fla. 1982)).
80. 652 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
81. Id. at 1225 (citations omitted); cf. Olson v. Potter, 650 So. 2d 635, 637 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1995) (stating "trial court should have awarded [§ 57.105] attorney's fees to the
appellees/cross-appellants since they prevailed on the motion for summary judgment on the
doctrine of res judicata").
82. 632 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
83. Id. at 131.
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the Fourth District Court of Appeal recently dismissed the appeal of an
order of entitlement to attorney's fees.84
In Winkelman, the appellant challenged a post-judgment order which
had determined the appellee's entitlement to (but not the amount of)
attorney's fees." The appellate court found that it lacked jurisdiction to
review an order as to the "entitlement" to attorney's fees when the amount
had yet to be determined.86 Indeed, even in cases where an appellant is
completely justified in challenging "entitlement," jurisdiction will still not
lie from that order (in the absence of a judicial determination of the
amount). 87
84. Reliable Reprographics Blueprint & Supply, Inc. v. Florida Mango Office Park, Inc.,
645 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
85. Winkelman, 632 So. 2d at 131. The court considered an order for entitlement to
attorney's fees similar to a partial summary judgment, which was governed by rule
9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv), stating that the rule authorizes the appeal of non-final orders which
determine "the" issue of liability, not "an" issue of liability. Id. at 131.
86. Id. The court explained that:
Allowing appeals from such an order as this one would mean that any time a
court enters an order determining a party is entitled to attorney's fees, costs, or
some other type of relief which could be construed as "affirmative relief," it
could generate two appeals, one from the order of entitlement, and a second
from the order determining the amount, even before a final judgment, which
could then produce a third appeal. Another reason why orders merely
determining entitlement to attorney's fees should not be appealable is because
consideration of entitlement and amount are frequently overlapping consider-
ations which cannot be separated.
Id. at 132; see also Hunt v. Hunt, 648 So. 2d 764, 766 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Trans
Atl. Distrib., L.P. v. Whiland & Co., S.A., 646 So. 2d 752, 752 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (appealing an order which determined entitlement to attorney's fees but not amount
must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); First Oak Brook Corp. Syndicate, Inc. v. Swiss
Beach Holdings, Inc., 644 So. 2d 1030, 1030 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Gonzalez Eng'g,
Inc., v. Miami Pump & Supply Co., 641 So. 2d 474, 474 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(finding court was without jurisdiction to review post-final judgment order which determined
appellant was entitled to attorney's fees but § 57.105 of the Florida Statutes did not fix
amount.); Cooper v. Cooper, 641 So. 2d 198, 198 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
87. See Noggle v. Turner Cattle Co., 656 So. 2d 619, 620 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
see also Hernando County v. Leisure Hills, Inc., 648 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (stating that until damage amount is assessed, no appeal may lie for judgment of
liability); McIlveen v. McIlveen, 644 So. 2d 612, 612 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Trans
Atil. Distrib., LP., 646 So. 2d at 752; Gonzalez Eng'g, Inc., 641 So. 2d at 474; Adlow, Inc.
v. Mauda, Inc., 632 So. 2d 714,714 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Knight v. Mastrianni, 626
So. 2d 338, 338 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) ('"We decline review of the order granting
attorney's fees since it does not fix the amount of the fee awarded. Thus, the issue of
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V. IMPACT OF THE FABRE DECISION
A. All's "Wells" That Ends Well
When interpreting the infamous footnote three in Fabre v. Marin,88
our supreme court has determined that a non-settling defendant is not
entitled to a setoff from non-economic damages based on the amount paid
by the settling defendant.8 9 The court reasoned that the set-off statutes
were applicable to economic damages, and for purposes of calculating the
non-settling defendant's obligation, the settlement proceeds were to be
apportioned between economic and non-economic damages in the same
proportion as the jury's award.9" Arguing that the set-off statutes are only
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988); cf Reliable Reprographics, 645 So. 2d at 1042 (distinguishing
Winkelman on ground that order may be appealable where trial court denies motion for
attorney's fees, since issue of attorney fees is completely resolved).
88. Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182, 1186 (Fla. 1993). There are a number of recently
decided cases which apply or interpret Fabre. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Guard Servs., Inc. v.
Nash, 654 So. 2d 155, 156 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Ashraf v. Smith, 647 So. 2d 892,
893 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding hospital should have been included on verdict
form), review denied, 658 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1995); City of Homestead v. Martins, 645 So. 2d
187, 187 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (concluding trial court erred in entering judgment
against hospital for amount exceeding percentage of liability apportioned to it by jury);
Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Viera, 644 So. 2d 563, 564 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that despite fact that county was not party to suit at trial, court should have
instructed jury to apportion liability of county which owned building in which accident
occurred even though county had settled with victim's estate); Owens-Illinois v. Baione, 642
So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.) (stating apportionment of fault is precluded where
evidence is insufficient for jury to make accurate assessment of fault of other entities who
manufactured asbestos products), review denied, 649 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1994); BellSouth
Human Resources Admin., Inc. v. Colatarci, 641 So. 2d 427, 428 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (finding it was error to fall to include non-party tortfeasors on verdict form); East West
Karate Ass'n, Inc. v. Riquelme, 638 So. 2d 604, 605 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
trial court erred in not submitting name of karate student who administered kick which
caused plaintiff's injury together with name of karate association on jury verdict form;
despite fact that student was not party to suit, association was only required to pay non-
economic damages in amount proportionate to percentage of fault); Graham v. Brown, No.
93-1110-CIV-T-17A, 1994 WL 456631, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 1994) (holding fault can
be apportioned to third party even where defendant has caused removal of third party from
action).
89. Wells v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Ctr., Inc., 659 So. 2d 249 (Fla.
1995).
90. Id. at 252-53; cf. Hoch v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615 (Ct. App. 1994)
(reasoning that to apply set-off provisions in situations of several liability would discourage
rather than encourage settlement). The Hoch court stated if the settlement was "low," the
plaintiff would receive less that the non-economic damages awarded by the jury. Hoch, 29
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applicable where there is common liability, as in the case of economic
damages, Wells asserted that the payment by one tortfeasor should only
extinguish that tort feasor's liability and have no effect on another
tortfeasor's liability.91 Thus, Wells contended, where liability is deter-
mined by the jury as a percentage of fault, section 768.81(3) would apply
and there would be no set-off.92 Using the language in section 46.015, the
court reasoned93 that a defendant sued under section 768.81 may not be
jointly liable with other defendants for non-economic damages.94 In light
of this determination, the court needed only to categorize the damages to
ascertain the non-settling defendants' obligation." As the court noted, "the
settlement proceeds should be divided between economic and non-economic
damages in the same proportion as the jury's award. 96
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617. If the settlement was "high," the non-settling defendant would reap the
benefit, paying less than their fault-share of the non-economic damages. This would be
inequitable and provide "little incentive for the injured person to settle with one or fewer and
all of the tort feasors." Id.; see also McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 114 S. Ct. 1461, 1467-70
(1994); Neil v. Kavena, 859 P.2d 203, 206 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (no set-off of settlement
amounts where liability of defendants is several rather than joint and several); Thomas v.
Solberg, 442 N.W. 2d 73 (Iowa 1989); Wilson v. Gault, 668 P.2d 1104 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 668 P.2d 308 (N.M. 1983). But see Curtis v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 831 P.2d
541 (Idaho 1992), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Laughten v. City of Pocatello, 886
P.2d 330 (Idaho 1994).
91. Wells, 659 So. 2d at 251.
92. Id.
93. The court distinguished Dionese v. City of West Palm Beach, 500 So. 2d 1347 (Fla.
1987), on the basis that the apportionment in question was among different causes of action
and not between economic and non-economic damages. Wells, 659 So. 2d at 254.
94. Wells, 659 So. 2d at 253. The court reasoned the § 46.015 does not apply to non-
economic damages. Id. The court also held that § 768.041 does not apply to non-economic
damages. Id.
95. Id, The court also reasoned that a jury verdict as the basis for allocation would
buffer possible collusion between settling parties as to the allocation of economic and non-
economic damages. lt
96. Wells, 659 So. 2d at 254. The concurrence is well taken. Justice Wells, joined by
Justice Kogan, suggested that there are potential due process problems in having a jury
apportion the liability of settling parties who are no longer parties to the judicial proceedings.
Id. (Wells, J., concurring). These settling parties present no evidence, cross-examine no
witnesses, and make no arguments. Id. It may be time to reexamine Fabre and Allied-
Signal in light of the ponderable, substantive, and procedural problems which have become
evident since these decisions were released. Id. It is also significant to note that similar
statutes have been held unconstitutional. See Newville v. Department of Family Servs., 883
P.2d 793, 803 (Mont. 1994) (holding allocation of percentages of liability to non-parties
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B. An Unsettling Experience
A nonsettling defendant is not entitled to a credit against what it owes
the plaintiff when another defendant settles for less than what that defendant
would have owed. In Dewitt Excavating, Inc. v. Walters,97 the Fifth
District Court of Appeal held that it was a violation of section 768.81 to
require the defendant to pay the first $25,000 and 25% of the remainder of
the plaintiffs noneconomic damages. 98  The court also reiterated the
statutory dictate that the doctrine of joint and several liability has no
application where damages exceed $25,000. 9'
VI. DuTY
A. Service with a Smile
A retail establishment is not subject to liability under section 768.125
of the Florida Statutes when it sells alcohol in closed containers to an adult
to be consumed off of the premises of the establishment. 1' ° In Persen v.
Southland Corp., 0 the Supreme Court of Florida reasoned that since the
legislature used the words "knowingly serves," they must have intended that
the habitual drunkard exception apply only to bars, taverns, or restau-
rants.1°2 The court's construction of section 768.125 also appears consis-
97. 642 So. 2d 833, 834 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
98. Id. Section 768.81(5) of the Florida Statutes provides that "[n]otwithstanding the
provisions of this section, the doctrine of joint and several liability applies to all actions in
which the total amount of damages does not exceed $25,000." FLA. STAT. § 768.81(5)
(1993).
99. Dewitt, 642 So. 2d at 834; cf PAM Transp. v. Freightliner Corp., 57 F.3d 746, 747
(9th Cir. 1995) (holding Arizona statute which almost completely destroyed joint and several
liability eliminated right of contribution where settling defendant's liability is "several only").
100. See FLA. STAT. § 768. 125 (1993). Section 768.125 entitled "[1]iability for injury
or damage resulting from intoxication," provides:
A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful
drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or
resulting from the intoxication of such person, except that a person who willfully
and unlawfully sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person who is not of
lawful drinking age or who knowingly serves a person habitually addicted to the
use of any or all alcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or damage
caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person.
Id.
101. 656 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1995).
102. Id. at 455. The court interpreted the legislative intent of the statutory language
"knowingly serves" as referring to a habitual drunkard, rather than the statutory language
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tent with the legislature's decision that there is a distinction between liability
under 1) the habitual drunkard exception and 2) the criminal statute. 3
Through this holding, the Supreme Court of Florida appears to have
extended much greater protection to retail establishments that sell alcoholic
beverages to be consumed off of the premises.
B. Don't Punish the Parents Unless They Did Something Too
Rejecting that Winn-Dixie v. Robinson"° imposed an alternative
avenue of direct liability for punitive damages in the absence of fault, the
court in Schropp v. Crown Eurocars, Inc. 5 stated that there are only two
methods of imposing liability for punitive damages against a (parent)
corporation: 1) The traditional Mercury Motors"° additional fault require-
ment; and 2) direct liability (i.e. without the need to show additional fault)
where the plaintiff can show the actions in question were committed by an
"owner" or "managing agent" of the corporation. 7
C. Taking Another Bite out of Dog Owners
Dog owners beware: The "independent contractor exception" to the
"dangerous instrumentality doctrine" is not available to a dog owner as a
"sells or furnishes," which refers to minors. Id
103. Id. The criminal statute would extend liability to "[any person who shall sell, give
away, dispose of, exchange, or barter" any alcoholic beverage to a habitual drunkard. FLA.
STAT. § 562.50 (1993).
104. 472 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1985). Here, an assistant store manager expressly approved
of the torts which had been committed against the plaintiff. Id. at 723. The acts of the store
manager provided the jury with evidence of misconduct sufficient for direct liability under
the managing-agent rule. Id.
105. 654 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1995). Plaintiff, Schropp, purchased a new Mercedes-Benz
from the defendant, Crown Eurocars, Inc. Shortly thereafter, Schropp complained about spots
on the finish of the car. After several unsuccessful attempts by Schropp to have the defect
corrected, he finally left the car with the defendant for several days at the request of the sales
manager. Again, Schropp was not satisfied with the defendant's attempts to remove the
spots. This suit followed when the defendant refused to exchange Schropp's car for a new
one. Id at 1158-59.
106. Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1981). Under the
vicarious liability theory, a corporation can be held liable for punitive damages if the plaintiff
establishes that the conduct of the employee was willful and wanton and establishes some
additional fault on the part of the corporate employer. Id. at 549.
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defense to an action brought pursuant to section 767.04108 of the Florida
Statutes.
In Wipperfurth v. Huie,'° the defendant was boarding his canine with
the plaintiff's employer."' The plaintiff was bitten by the dog while it
was being boarded and he sued the defendant. The defendant alleged the
kennel was liable while the kennel was watching the dog."' Relying on
Belcher Yacht, Inc. v. Stickney,"2 the supreme court contrarily defined the
term "owner" in section 767.04 as applying only to the dog's actual
owner."3 Thus, the court held that defendant remained liable while his
dog was in the kennel." 4 The court's holding thus extends the duty of
dog owners to kennel employees where they board their dogs."5
108. Section 767.04 of the Florida Statutes provides:
The owner of any dog that bites any person while such person is on or in a
public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the
owner of the dog, is liable for damages suffered by persons bitten, regardless of
the former viciousness of the dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness.
However, any negligence on the part of the person bitten that is a proximate
cause of the biting incident reduces the liability of the owner of the dog by the
percentage that the bitten person's negligence contributed to the biting incident.
A person is lawfully upon private property of such owner within the meaning of
this act when he is on such property in the performance of any duty imposed
upon him by the laws of this state or by the laws or postal regulations of the
United States, or when he is on such property upon invitation, expressed or
implied, of the owner. However, the owner is not liable, except as to a person
under the age of 6, or unless the damages are proximately caused by a negligent
act or omission of the owner, if at the time of any such injury the owner had
displayed in a prominent place on his premises a sign easily readable including
the words "Bad Dog." The remedy provided by this section is in addition to and
cumulative with any other remedy provided by statute or common law.
FLA. STAT. § 767.04 (1993).
109. 654 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1995).
110. Id. at 116. The independent contractor exception to the doctrine is inapplicable
because the dangerous instrumentality doctrine itself is inapplicable to an action brought
pursuant to § 767.04 of the Florida Statutes. Id. at 117; see also Donner v. Arkwright-
Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 21, 26 (Fla. 1978) (holding that jury should not have
been instructed on assumption of risk, but only on defenses expressed in § 768.04).
111. Wipperfurth, 654 So. 2d at 116-17.
112. 450 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 1984).
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D. Physicians Are Warned about the Duty to Warn
Doctor's take heed: Physicians may be held liable to third persons who
are not their patients for failing to warn them of known dangers. In Pate
v. Threlkel,"6 the plaintiff alleged that a doctor had a duty to warn the
plaintiff's mother of the risks to her children of a genetically transmitted
disease.
In Pate, the doctor's failure to warn prevented early detection of the
plaintiff's (child's) cancer, significantly reducing her chances of successfully
treating the disease." 7 In rejecting privity as necessary to establish liability
between a patient's child and a health care provider,"' the court reasoned
that the prevailing standard of care may create a duty to certain identified
third parties where the physician knows of the existence of those third
parties.119 The court noted that this duty to warn could be satisfied by
warning the patient, whom it is presumed will inform the third parties. 20
The court through this holding joined the large number of jurisdictions that
protect innocent third parties from harm by imposing a greater duty upon a
doctor to persons other than his patients. 1 '
116. 20 Fla. L. Weekly S356 (July 20, 1995). The author claims a hollow victory in
this court's rejection as to the application of Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1991), as his argument was exactly what the supreme court adopted in Pate.
117. Id.
118. Id. at S358.
119. Id. "[IMack of privity does not necessarily foreclose liability if a duty of care is
otherwise established." Id. at S357 (quoting Baskerville-Donovan Eng'rs, Inc. v. Pensacola
Exec. House Condominium Ass'n, 581 So. 2d 1301, 1303 (Fla. 1991)).
120. Pate, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at S358.
121. See, e.g., White v. United States, 780 F.2d 97, 101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (deciding
that psychotherapist in certain circumstances bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to
protect foreseeable victim from danger); Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 398 (9th
Cir. 1983) (holding liability exists against psychotherapisis for failure to warn where victim
was foreseeable and identifiable); Reiser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462, 479 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (applying similar duty to warn to decision of paroling dangerous sex-offender),
modifled on other grounds, 580 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc); Hicks v. United States,
511 F.2d 407, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating attack on wife by patient was foreseeable
because it was closely related to reason he was receiving treatment); Brady v. Hopper, 570
F. Supp. 1333, 1339 (D. Colo. 1982) (stating that "specific threats to specific victims" states
workable, reasonable, and fair boundary upon sphere of therapist's liability for acts of
patients), aff'd, 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp.
185, 193 (D. Neb. 1980) (recognizing psychiatrist had duty to initiate whatever precautions
were reasonably necessary to protect potential victims from violence when staff knew or
should have known of patient's dangerous propensities); Williams v. United States, 450 F.
Supp. 1040, 1046 (D.S.D. 1978) (recognizing liability of government for shooting death of
23
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three persons one day after mental patient was released from V.A. Hospital); Smith v. United
States, 437 F. Supp. 1004, 1010 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (holding psychotherapist liable for failure
to predict dangerousness of patient), rev'd on other grounds, 587 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1978);
Greenberg v. Barbour, 322 F. Supp. 745, 747-48 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (explaining failure of
physicians to admit homicidal patient can be negligent); Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409, 418-20 (D.N.D. 1967) (stating psychiatrist is liable for
failure to predict dangerous propensities of patient); Hamman v. County of Maricopa, 775
P.2d 1122, 1128 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc) (psychiatrist in some circumstances owes duty to
protect possible victim); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal.
1976) (stating when therapist determines or should determine that patient poses serious risk
of violence to another, therapist must use reasonable care to protect that person which may
require duty to warn); Mero v. Sadoff, 37 Cal. Rptr. 769, 776 (Ct. App. 1995) (stating
physician may be liable for examination even where there is no physician-patient
relationship); Reisner v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 520 (Ct. App.
1995) (stating where defendant doctor negligently failed to tell 12-year-old girl, his surgical
patient, or her family that she received AIDS-tainted blood and three years later, young
woman innocently infected her boyfriend by their sexual relations, defendant's duty to warn
extended to boyfriend notwithstanding that at time of AIDS-tainted transfusion boyfriend was
unknown and unidentified third person); Myers v. Quesenberry, 193 Cal. Rptr. 733, 735 (Ct.
App. 1983) (holding doctor's liability to extend to unknown but foreseeable third party when
doctor failed to warn patient of risk of driving in her condition); Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d
1198, 1212 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (explaining psychiatrist owes duty of care to make sure
that patient does not pose a danger to third parties); Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1072
(Del. 1988) (upholding judgment against psychiatrist based on his failure to take reasonable
steps to protect potential victim from violence resulting from release of committed patient
who killed victim in auto accident while in psychotic state); Nova Univ. v. Wagner, 491 So.
2d 1116, 1118 (Fla. 1986) (deciding that child care institution that accepted emotionally
disturbed children it knew or should have known had propensity to commit acts that might
harm others owes duty to exercise reasonable care in its operation to avoid harm to general
public); Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Lopez, 443 So. 2d 947, 948 (Fla. 1983) (holding seller of
insurance has duty to investigate where it has actual knowledge of beneficiary's murderous
intentions to its insured); Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (stating exception to general rule that there is no duty to control conduct of another
or to give warning to those placed in danger by that conduct arises where there is special
relationship between defendant and person whose actions need to be controlled or person
whose injury is foreseeable from failure to control conduct); Tucker v. Lavernia, 451 So. 2d
972, 973 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (explaining whether harm inflicted by particular
patient was actionable was question of fact precluding summary judgment); Hofmann v.
Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (explaining physician has duty
to warn if patient poses threat to third parties); Bradley v. Wessner, 287 S.E.2d 716, 721 (Ga.
Ct. App.) (holding lack of privity between physician and ultimate victim not sufficient to
eliminate duty to warn), aff'd, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982); Eckhardt v. Kirts, 534 N.E.2d
1339, 1344 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (deciding cause of action arises against psychiatrist for failure
to warn); In re Votteler, 327 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Iowa 1982) (holding duty to warn exists
where foreseeable victim does not know of danger); Freese v. Lemmon, 210 N.W.2d 576,
580 (Iowa 1973) (stating complaint that alleges physician knew of patient's danger but failed
Vol. 20
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to warn not dismissable for failure to state cause of action); Kansas State Bank & Trust Co.
v. Specialized Transp. Servs., Inc., 819 P.2d 587, 604 (Kan. 1991) (finding no cause of
action for failure to report); Durflinger v. Artiles, 673 P.2d 86, 94 (Kan. 1983) (recognizing
cause of action against psychiatrist for negligence for failure to protect ultimate victims of
patient, his mother and younger brother); Evans v. Morehead Clinic, 749 S.W.2d 696, 699
(Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (holding therapist owes duty of ordinary care to protect reasonably
foreseeable victim of danger from assault by patient); Joy v. Eastern Maine Medical Ctr., 529
A.2d 1364, 1366 (Me. 1987) (recognizing it is jury question whether physician should have
warned under particular set of circumstances); Furr v. Spring Grove State Hosp., 454 A.2d
414, 418 (Md. 1983) (following Restatement, stating duty applies if special relationship
exists); Bardoni v. Kim, 390 N.W.2d 218, 226-27 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (explaining whether
psychiatrist should have known patient was dangerous specifically to his brother was fact
issue, precluding summary judgment); Welke v. Kuzilla, 375 N.W.2d 403, 406 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1985) (holding doctor's injection given night before accident raised cause of action for
third party victim); Lough v. Rolla Women's Clinic, Inc., 866 S.W.2d 851, 854-55 (Mo.
1993) (deciding where defendant clinic negligently failed to administer RhoGam to Rh-
negative expectant mother, causing her to develop antibodies that attacked blood cells of her
subsequently conceived Rh-positive child, clinic was liable for such preconception negligence
to then unconceived and later born child); Fosgate v. Corona, 330 A.2d 355, 358 (N.J. 1974)
(holding doctor liable to relatives of tubercular patient for negligently having failed to
diagnose the disease that led to infection of relatives); McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500,
508 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (deciding substantial fact issue as to whether
psychiatrist owed duty to warn victim precluded summary judgment); Wilschinsky v. Medina,
775 P.2d 713, 717 (N.M. 1989) (holding physician owed duty to public after administering
drugs to patient with known side effects that might impair patient's judgment); Homere v.
State, 361 N.Y.S.2d 820, 824-25 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1974) (holding hospital liable in negligence
for releasing patient who assaulted plaintiff), aff'd, 370 N.Y.2d 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975);
Pangbum v. Saad, 326 S.E.2d 365, 367 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (holding complaint against
psychiatrist stated claim for relief in negligence for patient who stabbed plaintiffs sister
shortly after release); Leverett v. State, 399 N.E.2d 106, 109 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978)
(explaining motions to dismiss are inappropriate in negligence claims involving physicians'
duty to take precautionary measures); Wharton Trans. Corp. v. Bridges, 606 S.W.2d 521,
526-27 (Tenn. 1980) (holding physician liable for failure to take precautionary steps if his
conduct falls below recognized standard of accepted professional practice in medical
profession and specialty thereof, if any, that is prevailing in community in which he
practiced); Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 369 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (explaining that under
proper facts, physician can owe duty to use reasonable care to protect public); Peck v.
Counseling Serv., 499 A.2d 422, 427 (Vt. 1985) (recognizing psychiatrist had duty to warn
third party that patient was likely to cause property damage); Peterson v. State, 671 P.2d 230,
237 (Wash. 1983) (holding psychiatrist who diagnosed patient as "gravely disabled" had duty
to take reasonable precautions to protect persons who might be endangered by the patient's
dangerous propensities); Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 398 P.2d 14, 16 (Wash. 1965)
(holding where plaintiffs truck driver had accident injuring several people, and plaintiff-
employer thereafter settled with victims and sought indemnity from doctor alleging doctor
negligently failed to diagnose driver's disabilities and warn driver, it was expectable that if
doctor negligently certified unfit person as qualified to drive commercial vehicle, any injury
25
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VII. ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE: YOU CAN'T ALWAYS WIN WITH
THE ECONOMIC Loss RULE
During the last year, the courts in Florida decided several cases'2
involving the application of the "economic loss rule."'' 2  The economic
to third person from highway accident was well within range of apprehension), modified, 401
P.2d 350 (Wash. 1965); Schuster v. Altenburg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Wis. 1988)
(recognizing complaint stated cause of action for relief based on psychiatrist's failure to take
reasonable measures to protect from patient).
122. See, e.g., Florida Bldg. Inspection Serv., Inc. v. Arnold Corp., 20 Fla. L. Weekly
D1703, D1703 (3d Dist. Ct. App. July 26, 1995) (deciding to decline any further erosion of
the economic loss doctrine); Greens of Town & Country Condominium Ass'n v. Greens of
Tampa, Inc., 653 So. 2d 1136, 1137 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding economic loss
rule bars negligence claims where no additional personal injury or damages to any other
property occurs); see also Palau Int'l Traders, Inc., v. Narcam Aircraft, Inc., 653 So. 2d 412,
416 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining economic loss doctrine precluded subsequent
airplane purchaser from recovering from airplane inspector for economic losses arising out
of negligence in failing to locate flaw in airplane, despite absence of privity of contract and
no personal injury or property damage to property other than airplane); C.A. Oaks Constr.
Co., Inc. v. Ajax Paving Indus. Inc., 652 So. 2d 914, 915 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(stating dismissal of counter claim based on negligent performance of contract work was
proper where economic loss rule bars tort recovery as between parties for purely economic
losses); City of Tampa v. Thornton-Tomasetti, P.C., 646 So. 2d 279, 281-82 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing economic loss doctrine precluded City's recovery in negligence
claim from engineering consulting firm for City's economic losses flowing from construction
of public building); see also Hoseline, Inc. v. USA Diversified Prods., Inc., 40 F.3d 1198,
1199-2000 (1 th Cir. 1994) (holding economic loss doctrine barred manufacturer's recovery
of damages against supplier for common law fraud and theft, where claims arose from breach
of contractual duty, and manufacturer did not allege any physical or property damage;
economic loss doctrine bars claims between parties who lack contractual privity; economic
loss doctrine bars tort recovery for contract claims which involve no injury to person or
property).
123. This rule prohibits plaintiffs from raising tort claims without evidence of personal
injury or property damage for the sole purpose of recovering economic damages arising from
a breach of contract. See Jones v. Childers, 18 F.3d 899, 904 (11th Cir. 1994). The two
most commonly referred cases are Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Charlie Toppino
& Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993) and AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987). In Casa Clara, homeowners sued a concrete supplier under a
negligence theory for having provided defective concrete which caused damage to buildings
it was used in. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1245. Because no damage to other property
occurred and nothing more than economic losses were involved, the plaintiff had no tort
claim against the concrete supplier. Id. at 1247-48. In AFM Corp., the court held that AFM,
which contracted with Southern Bell to have its name advertised in the yellow pages, could
not maintain a tort claim solely for economic losses. AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 180-81. The
court concluded that without a showing of some conduct resulting in personal injury or
26
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loss rule bars recovery even where there was "no alternative remedy"
outside of the tort claims." The court in SFC Valve Corp. v. Wright
Machine Corp. reasoned that to recognize a "'no alternative remedy' excep-
tion" to the rule would "cut[ ] against the purpose[s] of the economic loss
rule."' The court's holding strengthened the economic loss rule and
demonstrated the court's preference for encouraging parties to negotiate for
warranty protection or to take other steps, such as purchasing insurance, in
order to protect their economic interests.126
The economic loss rule will not defeat the claims of a "foreseeable
plaintiff" even if there is no contract between the parties. In Southland
Construction, Inc. v. Richeson Corp.,27 a general contractor, sued the
defendant, an engineer, for negligence in failing to meet professional
engineering standards in designing a wall." Although there was no
contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, the court permitted the tort
action, finding that "Richeson, as an individual professional, owed Southland
a duty to perform his professional duties in a professional, competent
manner."
129
The economic loss rule also does not apply to tort claims where a
finished product causes damage to property other than itself.3 ' The
property damage, there could be no independent tort claim. Id at 181-82.
124. SFC Valve Corp. v. Wright Mach. Corp., 883 F. Supp. 710, 715 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
In SFC Valve, the defendant, Wright, sold valve stems to Southern Corporation pursuant to
a contract between the parties. Id. at 712. The certifications provided by Wright to
Southern, which were required by the contract, were falsified. When Southern filed for
bankruptcy, the plaintiff, SFC Valve, purchased Southern's assets, including the contract with
Wright. After SFC discovered the falsified certifications, it reopened Southern's bankruptcy
case in order to determine any causes of action Southern may have had against Wright for
the falsified certifications. The bankruptcy court auctioned off these causes of action as
assets, which Wright acquired by being the highest bidder. Id. at 712-13.
125. Id. at 715. The purpose of the economic loss rule is to encourage parties to protect
their economic losses by purchasing insurance or negotiating for warranty protection. Id.
126. In addition, the court relied on Hoseline, Inc. v. U.S.A. Diversified Prods., Inc., 40
F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 1994), finding no distinguishing facts in SFC Valve to warrant a
different result. SFC Valve, 883 F. Supp. at 716.
127. 642 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
128. Id. at 8-9. Economic losses consist of disappointed economic expectations and
include damages for inadequate value, cost of repair and replacement of a defective product,
or consequential loss of profits. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1246.
129. Southland, 642 So. 2d at 8; accord A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397
(Fla. 1973). The holding of this case, which is limited to its facts, stated that a general
contractor has a cause of action for the alleged negligent supervisory performance by an
architect. A.R. Moyer, Inc., 285 So. 2d at 402.
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Second District Court of Appeal, in E.L Du Pont de Numours & Co. v.
Finks Farms, Inc.,31 permitted an action in tort because the defendant's
fungicide caused damage to other property, the plaintiff's tomato crop.
132
In finding liability, the court distinguished this case from Casa Clara.1
33
In addition, the court found that the product used here was not "ineffective,"
but rather "defective" because it damaged other property.1' Equally
significant, the Third District Court of Appeal has also recently ruled that
the economic loss rule does not bar claims for fraud in the inducement. 35
VIII. NEGLIGENCE
A. You Still Need to Make an Impact for Success
Two recent cases 136 illustrate the supreme court's reluctance to join
the majority of jurisdictions that have abolished the "impact rule."'137 In
R.J. v. Humana of Florida Inc.,' 38 the plaintiff sought recovery for
psychological injuries caused by a negligent diagnosis that the plaintiff was
HIV positive. 39 The court rejected the plaintiff's claim and upheld the
131. 656 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
132. Id. at 172. "The economic loss rule prohibits tort recovery when a product
damages itself, causing economic loss, but does not cause personal injury or damage to any
property other than itself." Id. at 172 (citing Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1246).
133. Id. at 173. In E.L DuPont, the fungicide as a finished product damaged plaintiff's
"other property," namely his tomato crop. Id. at 172-73.
134. E.L DuPont, 656 So. 2d at 173. The defendant's fungicide, purchased independent-
ly by the plaintiff, damaged the plaintiffs plants. Id. at 173. This holding was not
precluded by the facts of King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 1030 (1989), because the plaintiff did not purchase his plants with the fungicide
already sprayed on them. E.I. Dupont, 656 So. 2d at 173. Contra Monsanto Agric. Prods.
Co. v. Edenfield, 426 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
135. See HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 20 Fla. L. Weekly D2086,
D2086 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1995).
136. R.J. v. Humana of Fla. Inc., 652 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1995); Gonzalez v. Metro. Dade
County Public Health Trust, 651 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1995); cf City of Hollywood v. Karl, 643
So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994). But see K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn.
1995).
137. Under the impact rule, before a plaintiff can recover damages for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress, the distress suffered must flow from physical injuries the
plaintiff sustained in an impact. Gonzalez, 651 So. 2d at 676; see Reynolds v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 611 So. 2d 1294, 1296 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied,
623 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1993).
138. 652 So. 2d at 360.
139. Id. at 362.
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validity of the impact rule."4 In Gonzalez, the plaintiff sued the defen-
dants for psychological injuries resulting from inaccurate statements that the
plaintiff's child, who had died months earlier, had actually never been
buried and remained in the refrigerator at the hospital morgue.14 The
Supreme Court of Florida found the claim uncognizable without willful or
wanton misconduct or physical injury.142 The court also refused to adopt
section 868 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.!43
140. Cf. K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 553 (stating actual exposure to HIV must be alleged in
order to establish claim for emotional distress resulting from fear of contracting AIDS).
141. Gonzalez, 651 So. 2d at 674.
142. Id. at 675.
143. Id. at 676. By holding this way, the court reaffirmed Donahoo v. Bess, 200 So.
541 (Fla. 1941), which held that absent physical injury, Florida law will not permit a suit for
emotional distress caused by the negligent handling of a dead body, and refused to adopt §
868 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Under § 868 "one who intentionally, recklessly
or negligently removes, withholds, mutilates, or operates upon the body of a dead person or
prevents its proper interment or cremation is subject to liability to a member of the family
of the deceased who is entitled to the disposition of the body." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 868 (1977).
The Impact Rule continues to be liberalized. See Zell v. Meek, 20 Fla. L. Weekly
S515 (Fla. Oct. 5, 1995) (holding plaintiff who witnessed her father's death when his
apartment was bombed stated claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress although
plaintiff did not begin experiencing physical impairment until nine months after bombing).
It is time to abolish the impact rule in favor of a fair and equitable traditional pleading
and proof system that requires the plaintiff seeking damages for mental and emotional harm
to similarly plead and produce fact witnesses, expert testimony, or other relevant evidence
for jury consideration. Accord Angrand v. Key, 657 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1995) (stating under
certain circumstances, grief experts may testify).
The impact doctrine was first enunciated in England in 1888 in the case of Victorian
Railway Commission v. Coultas 13 App. Cas. 222; see also Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d
466 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972). Significantly, it was quickly rejected in England but not
until after having been accepted into our system of jurisprudence. See Dulieu v. White &
Sons, 2 K.B. 669 (1901).
While the impact rule remained a thorn in the side of those parties who rightfully
suffered from psychic injury (unfortunately or fortunately) unaccompanied by physical
impact, recent decisions of our and other courts began to recognize the harsh inequity of the
rule. In 1985, for example, the Supreme Court of Florida in Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d
17 (Fla. 1985), was faced with a claim by the estate of a mother who sought damages for
psychic injury when she had a heart attack after seeing her daughter at the scene of the
accident just after she was killed by a car driven by the defendant. Id. at 18. The court
decided that now it was time to recognize:
that the price of death or significant discernible physical injury, when caused by
psychological trauma resulting from a negligent injury imposed upon a close
family member within the sensory perception of the physically injured person,
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exists.
Id. at 18-19. Although not going as far as other jurisdictions which permitted recovery for
psychic trauma alone, without either physical injury or a "zone of danger" fright, see, e.g.,
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980), this court conceded that
psychic injury should be cognizable in certain situations. Champion, 478 So. 2d at 18-19.
The litmus test of "impact" (or the arbitrary "zone of danger" exception) as a
prerequisite to recovery for psychic trauma simply does not comport with reality and the
present day medical advancements. The apparent arbitrary diminution in the "severity" or
"value" of those claiming psychic injury (by not permitting such claims) is neither warranted
nor justified. Society has come to recognize and accept the reality and often indelible
severity of mental or emotional distress (psychic injury) and thus, now is the time for a
positive change in the law, which will respond to our medical advancement and inure to the
benefits of society as a whole.
Indeed, as well-regarded former Chief Judge Gerald Mager of the Fourth District
similarly noted:
The beauty of our judicial system is its flexibility in the pursuit of justice -- its
adherence to precedent yet its ability to reevaluate the continued vibrancy of
such precedent. It is certainly more forthright to review and reject an unsound
principle than to resort to judicial exceptions in order to obviate the harshness
of such principle.
Jones v. Hoffman, 272 So. 2d 529, 532 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
It is a great and honorable function of the supreme court to modify the law with
society's advancement and change. Quoting an earlier decision of the supreme court, Judge
Mager also reminds us in Jones that "[t]he law is not static. It must keep pace with changes
in our society, for the doctrine of stare decisis is not an iron mold which can never be
changed." Id. (quoting Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1971)).
Medical technology has advanced remarkably in detection and treatment of mental or
emotional distress. Pharmaceutical companies are now making billions of dollars on tricyclic
antidepressants, Mono-oxidase inhibitors, beta blockers, etc., all designed and (apparently
effective in) detection and treatment of the admittedly debilitating condition associated with
emotional and mental distress ("psychic injury").
Emotional or mental distress, whether accompanied by physical trauma, is real.
Ironically, the emotional or mental "trauma" can be far more devastating and indelible than
a physical injury from which an individual often recovers. We as a loving society cannot
dispute that scars of the heart often run deeper and are more "permanent" than those of the
skin. What we feel; our emotional state, often can weigh heavier than our body. We should
not send a message that this harm to this truly innocent person only becomes real if there is
some accompanying "impact." We, as a society, recognize the reality and severity of
psychological injury and the need for treatment (and redress). Therefore, persons who claim
justifiable psychological injury ought to have the right to present evidence to a jury.
Judge Mager's explanation in the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Jones
quite aptly responds to the three counter-arguments raised in support of the impact rule that
were mentioned or discussed in our supreme court's previous decisions such as Gilliam and
Champion: 1) the difficulty of proving causation between the damages and the alleged fright
or traumatic event; 2) the fear of fraudulent or exaggerated claims; and 3) the possibility of
Vol. 20
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B. A Step in the Right Direction for the Unborn Fetus
While reluctantly admitting that the present law in Florida prohibits an
action for the wrongful death of an unborn child,'" the First District Court
of Appeal in Young v. St. Vincent's Medical Center, Inc.,45 urged the
supreme court to join the majority of jurisdictions in recognizing such an
146action. It remains to be seen if the supreme court will follow the
district court's suggestion 47 that Florida law should change and conform
with the majority of states which recognize a cause of action for the death
of an unborn, but viable child.
148
opening the flood gates to litigation. Jones, 272 So. 2d at 530-33.
In light of the above, and the recognition that mental suffering is already an actionable
damage in certain cases, the impact rule should be abolished. See Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Brown, 66 So. 2d 679, 681 (Fla. 1953) (holding mental suffering constitutes
recoverable damages in cases of negligent defamation); Carson v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla.
1944) (regarding an invasion of privacy); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 569,
570, 652H, cmt. b (1977).
144. Hernandez v. Garwood, 390 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1980); Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d
303 (Fla. 1977). Both cases stand for the proposition that actions for wrongful death when
the child is "envetre sa nere" (in the womb of the mother) do not exist in Florida.
145. 653 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995). The plaintiff, who had been
pregnant with twins brought suit against the defendant "alleging negligent prenatal care and
the resulting wrongful death of her unborn daughter." Id. at 500. A doctor, who was in
training, tried to determine the maturity of the babies' lungs by withdrawing amniotic fluid,
but instead withdrew blood. A test was not performed to determine if the fetus was still
bleeding. As a result, one of the twins whose lungs were punctured was stillborn. A doctor
entered a sworn statement that the stillborn child was viable. Id. at 499-500.
146. Id. at 500.
147. Although one shudders to think it possible, if there is' no change in the law
regarding wrongful death actions for unborn children, it would appear to become beneficial
for a defendant to actively or through inaction cause the demise of an unborn child in order
to escape personal liability.
148. Jones, 653 So. 2d at 503. The burden of proving viability, injury, and damages
rests upon the claimant. Thirty-four state courts have judicially created a cause of action
permitting the recovery for the death of a fetus which was viable but delivered stillborn. In
three other states, the legislatures have created a statutory cause of action. Five states have
not passed on the matter, and seven states, including Florida, still deny recovery. See
generally Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995) (holding parents can sue for
wrongful death of nonviable fetus); T.A. Borowski, Jr., Comment, No Liability for the
Wrongful Death of Unborn Children-The Florida Legislature Refuses to Protect the Unborn,
16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 835, 839 (1988); Annotation, Right to Maintain Action or to Recover
Damages for Death of Unborn Children, 84 A.L.R.3d 411, 422-25 (1978 & Supp. 1994).
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C. Can't Cross the Road with that Chicken
An administrative decision of a professional's misconduct is not
conclusive proof of negligence in a subsequent civil action. 49 In Stogniew
v. McQueen,50 the supreme court stated that the lack of mutuality' of
obligation barred a party from using an administrative decision as conclusive
proof of negligence.1 52
D. He Who Has Gas Better Have Class
In an exception to the general rule that one is not responsible for the
unexpected criminal behavior of a third person, the Second District Court
of Appeal in Butala v. Automated Petroleum & Energy Co. Inc.,"5 3 found
that a retailer has a higher standard of care to protect a customer from a
known ongoing attack."5 The court found in favor of the plaintiff when
a third party, known by the station employees to be in a "foul mood," while
at the station to purchase gasoline, set the plaintiff customer on fire.'55
The court found that the self-service station owner had a duty to take
reasonable steps to protect patrons from on-premises gasoline fires that
could result from the unsupervised use of its pumps. 1 56 This holding may
be a springboard to extend liability to other retailers who fail to take
149. Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1995).
150. 656 So. 2d at 917.
151. The court was unwilling to follow the lead of certain other states and of the federal
courts in abandoning the requirement of mutuality in the application of collateral estoppel.
Id. at 919-20.
152. Id. In this case, the plaintiff sought counseling from the defendant, a licensed
family therapist, and later filed a complaint with the Florida Department of Business &
Professional Regulation ("DPR") alleging that the defendant violated § 491.009(2)(s) of the
Florida Statutes by falling to meet the minimum standards of performance in his professional
relationship with the plaintiff. The DPR found for the plaintiff. The plaintiff, who also filed
a civil suit for negligence, then tried to assert collateral estoppel and requested the trial court
to follow the DPR ruling. Id. at 918-19; cf Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen, 659 So. 2d 1064,
1066 (Fla. 1995) (holding rule requiring that there be mutuality of parties in order for
doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply has been abrogated by statute in context of civil theft
claim).
153. 656 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
154. Id. at 175.
155. Id. at 174.
156. Id. at 175.
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reasonable steps to protect a customer from the dangerous use of instrumen-
talities by third persons on the premises.'
1 7
E. The "Misuse" Absolute Defense is Absolutely Dead
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Standard Havens Products, Inc. v.
Benitez,15 8 abolished the absolute defense of product misuse in product lia-
bility actions alleging negligence.! 9 The Supreme Court of Florida con-
cluded that "much like the earlier demise of the absolute defense of
contributory negligence, product misuse merges into the defense of
comparative negligence. Consequently, product misuse reduces a plaintiff's
recovery in proportion to his or her comparative fault."''
F. Department of Corrections May Get Away with Prisoners Getting Away
Applying Florida law,16 1 the Florida Department of Corrections has
only a general duty to protect. 62 The First District Court of Appeal in
Department of Corrections v. McGhee,163 noted that it felt bound by its
earlier decision of the issue in Department of Corrections v. Vann,164
157. Cf. Hall v. Billy Jacks, Inc., 458 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1984); Surat v. Nu-Med
Pembroke, Inc., 632 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Faverty v. McDonald's
Restaurants, Inc., 892 P.2d 703 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (stating employer liable for third party's
injuries caused by off-duty employee who had worked 17 hours and fell asleep at wheel
while driving home).
158. 648 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1994).
159. Id. at 1192.
160. Id. at 1197; see also West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336'So. 2d. 80 (Fla. 1976);
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
161. Department of Corrections v. McGhee, 653 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1995). The court applied the "significant relationships" or "center of gravity" test from §
145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Id at 1092; see also Stallworth v.
Hospitality Rentals, Inc., 515 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987); cf Department of
Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. B.J.M., 656 So. 2d 906, 917 (Fla. 1995) (stating department
is not liable for negligent placement of child unless done in bad faith or with malicious
purpose, or if placement occurs in manner that exhibits wanton and Willful disregard of
human rights, safety, or property).
162. See Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Whaley, 574 So. 2d 100 (Fla.
1991).
163. 653 So. 2d 1091, 1091 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming trial court's ruling
to apply Florida law where escaped prisoners fled from Florida to Mississippi and murdered
Robert McGhee).
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however it recertified the same question as in Vann.' 65 The court also
held that "[tjhe determination of whether a state agency may be held liable
for its conduct within the state of Florida is properly determined pursuant
to Florida law. 166
IX. INSURANCE
A. It's No Longer "Fairly Debatable" That It Is
"Fairly Debatable"
The Supreme Court of Florida recently found that the "fairly debatable"
standard is not applicable to the determination of bad faith.167 The court
also reasoned that the statute which provides as a penalty damages
recoverable from an uninsured motorist insurer in a bad faith action includes
the total amount of the claimant's damages, including the amount in excess
of the policy limits, and is therefore not to be applied retroactively. 68
165. McGhee, 653 So. 2d at 1093. The certified question was:
WHETHER THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS MAY BE HELD




167. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 62 (Fla. 1995).
168. Id. at 61. The court itemized several other district courts that had rejected the
fairly debatable standard in both first party unfair insurance trade practices and third party
bad faith actions. Id. at 62. The case represents a significant step in giving insured's rights
to recover for the unfair practices of insurers. The author also notes that the recent decision
of Auto Owners Insurance Co. v. Conquest, 658 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1995), which provides that
the "any person" language in § 624.155 means "any person," not any insured, should "open
the door" to a wide range of "bad faith" actions against insurers. It is also significant to note
that in Puntervold v. Fortune Insurance Co., No.89-01819, sua sponte dismissed on other
grounds, the author asserted the same "any person means any person" argument. See
Appellants Initial Brief at 6-17 (No. 89-01819). While the Fourth District Court of Appeal
appeared poised to issue an opinion similar to the result reached in Conquest, it was forced
to dismiss without issuing an opinion on the substantive claim, due to a procedural trial
defect. Indeed, while the section does contain the terms "insured" and "insurer," it also
refers to "third party claimants," and "beneficiaries," as well as to "any person or persons"
indicating that the legislature knew the difference between the terms, and used them
intentionally. See, e.g., Heredia v. Allstate Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 1978). Perhaps
even more significantly, § 624.155(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes itemizes other statutory
sections wherein the phrase "any person" must be read to include others than the first party
insured. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 626.9651(i)(2) (1987) ("any other person with any interest
in the proceeds payable under such contract or policy"); id. § 626.9541(I)(x) ("refusal to
insure ... because of race, color, creed, marital status, sex or national origin .. ."); id. §
396 Vol. 20
34




In Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Tompkins,169 the Supreme Court of
Florida recently ruled that future economic damages may be recovered when
such damages are established with reasonable certainty and without the need
to show permanent injury.17 Although permanent injury is not a prerequi-
site to the recovery of future economic damages, it is a significant factor in
establishing reasonable certainty of future damages."'
626.9551 (all releases "[u]nreasonably disapprove the insurance policy.. ."); id. § 626.9705
(provision that "[n]o life or disability insurer shall refuse to ... sell, or issue a life or
disability insurance policy...").
169. 651 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1995).
170. Id. at 90. The plaintiff, after being involved in an auto accident, settled with his
tortfeasor's insurance company for $25,000, the liability limits of his policy. To recover the
damages which exceeded the $25,000 limit, the plaintiff sued his own insurance carrier,
Auto-Owners Insurance Company, for underinsured motorist benefits. At trial, the court
denied the plaintiffs request for a jury instruction which would have allowed the jury to
award future economic damages even where the jury failed to find that the plaintiff suffered
permanent injuries. Id. The instructions given to the jury only permitted them to award
future economic damages if permanent injury was found. Id. Since the jury did not find that
the plaintiff suffered permanent injuries, they only awarded the plaintiff for past economic
damages. Id. at 90. The plaintiff appealed and the Second District Court of Appeal
reversed, finding that the lower court erred in requiring the jury to find permanent injury as
a prerequisite to awarding future economic damages. Tompkins, 651 So. 2d at 90. The case
arrived before the court based on a conflict between the Second District Court of Appeal's
decision and the Fourth District Court of Appeal's ruling in Josephson v. Bowers, 595 So.
2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that there must be "permanent injury
before a defendant may be held liable for future loss of income and other future damages in
a personal injury claim").
171. Tompkins, 651 So. 2d at 91. The impact of this decision was to clear up any
confusion among the districts about what needs to be established before future economic
damages can be awarded. This holding established the "reasonable certainty" test and thus
clearly rejected any showing of permanent injury as a prerequisite for recovering future
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C. You Can't Give Away What You Don't Have
Although certifying the question,'72 the First District Court of Appeal
held that an estate may recover under both the liability and uninsured
motorist coverage of a deceased driver's policy, even though the uninsured
motorist coverage excluded the car from coverage.'73 Dianna Warren died
from injuries sustained on May 5, 1990 while a passenger in an automobile
involved in a single-vehicle accident. 74 The car owned by Edward
Chancey was driven by his daughter, Celeste Chancey Bryant, who was also
killed. 7' As personal representative, Mr. Warren instituted a wrongful
death action and sought recovery for his wife's injuries on the theory that
the injuries resulted from the wife's negligent operation and/or negligent
maintenance of the automobile which was insured by Travelers under a
policy Mr. Chancey had purchased from Phoenix.176 The estate settled
with the appellees for the liability coverage policy limits of $50,000, but
reserved all claims for benefits under the uninsured motorist provisions of
the policy. 177 On behalf of the estate, Mr. Warren then filed the present
complaint for declaratory judgment seeking uninsured motorist benefits. 78
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of appellees, finding that
the estate could not recover under both the liability and uninsured motorists
provisions of the same policy.'79 Because Reid v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co.1'c and its progeny' did not consider the validity of the
172. Warren v. Travelers Ins. Co., 650 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review
granted, 658 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 1995). The First District Court of Appeal certified the
following question:
MAY AN INJURED PERSON WHO IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER BODILY
INJURY LIABILITY BENEFITS, BUT WHOSE DAMAGES EXCEED THE
POLICY LIMIT FOR LIABILITY COVERAGE, ALSO RECOVER UNDER
THE SAME POLICY FOR UNINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS, WHERE
THE POLICY EXCLUDES THE INSURED VEHICLE FROM ITS DEFINI-
TION OF "UNINSURED VEHICLE"?
Id. at 1084.
173. Id. Travelers argued that because of an exclusion in the policy, the automobile
involved in the accident was not "uninsured." Id. at 1083. As a result, the trial court refused
to allow the estate of Dianna Warren to recover under both the liability and uninsured
motorist provisions of the same policy. Id.





179. Warren, 650 So. 2d at 1083.
180. 352 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 1977).
Vol. 20
36
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 9
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/9
Mager
"your car" exclusion, the court in distinguishing the two cases, reasoned that
"[e]xclusions to [uninsured motorist] coverage are not enforceable if the
injured person is covered by the [bodily injury liability] provisions of the
policy."
182
D. Peek-a-boo, We Can See You!
An uninsured or underinsured motorist carrier who has been lawfully
sued and properly joined as a party in a lawsuit should be disclosed to the
jury in its actual status as a party defendant. In Krawzak v. Government
Employees Insurance Co. ("GEICO"),'83 GEICO was the real party in
interest, being both the liability insurer and underinsured motorist carri-
er.' In requiring disclosure, the court reasoned that "[i]f there had been
a settlement with the tortfeasor, there would be no question that GEICO
would have been the only party before the jury."'' 5  In stating that
"GEICO could not have been made invisible or disguised in the courtroom"
as merely "the tortfeasor's co-counsel," the court reasoned:
An uninsured or underinsured motorist carrier should not be able to hide
its true identity by being severed from the lawsuit while retaining its
influence over the conduct of the lawsuit as co-counsel for the
tortfeasor. In this case, this procedure seems inherently unfair to the
plaintiff, deceptive to the jury, contrary to the insurance contract entered
into between the plaintiff and its insurer, and contrary to statute." 6
181. See, e.g., Smith v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 591 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1992); Brixius v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 589 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1991).
182. Warren, 650 So. 2d at 1083; see also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 569 So. 2d
1337, 1339 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
253 So. 2d 229, 233-34 (Fla. 1971)); cf. World Wide Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Welker, 640
So. 2d 46, 50 (Fla. 1994) (holding driver who was generally insured under mother's policy
as "resident relative" could not collect uninsured motorist benefits from mother's insurer
where driver had accepted financial responsibility for vehicle by obtaining his own liability
coverage, but had expressly rejected uninsured motorist coverage when he was operating his
vehicle).
183. 660 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
184. Id. at 307.
185. Id. at 309.
186. Id. The court rejected the analysis set forth in Colford v. Braun Cadillac, Inc., 620
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E. If You Choose to Jump in the Water, Expect to Get Wet
If an insurer assumes the defense of an action where it could have
denied coverage and the insured can demonstrate that the assumption of the
defense resulted in prejudice to the insured, the insurer is estopped from
subsequently raising the defense of non-coverage. In Doe v. Allstate
Insurance Co.,'87 the supreme court reasoned that once an insurer begins
to fulfill its promissory obligation to defend an insured by hiring counsel,
conducting a pre-trial investigation, and controlling the insured's defense,
a fiduciary duty arises which requires the exercise of good faith. 88
X. OTHER INTERESTING DEVELOPMENTS
A. Buckling Down on the Buckle Up Defense
The seat belt defense cannot be submitted to a jury, unless the plaintiff
presents "competent evidence"'89 that the failure to wear the seat belt
caused or substantially contributed to the injuries. The plaintiff in Zurline
v. Levesque,' 9° sued the driver of the car in which she was a passen-
ger. 91 Even though she was not wearing a seat belt, the court prohibited
the defendant from informing the jury of that fact because there was no
proof of causation.' 92
187. 653 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1995).
188. Id. at 373-74. See cases cited infra note 226 for other cases on the emergence and
application upon the implied covenant of good faith.
189. See Bums v. Smith, 476 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see also State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 565 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), dismissed, 570
So. 2d 1306 (Fla. 1990).
190. 642 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1170. The court used the Pasarkanis test from Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Pasarkanis, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984), which states that before a jury can consider the seat
belt defense, the defendant must plead and prove the following: 1) the plaintiff failed to use
"an available and fully operational seat belt;" 2) the nonuse was reasonable under the
circumstances; and 3) the plaintiffs failure to use the seat belt caused or contributed
substantially to his or her damages. Id. at 454. The court found that the defendant met the
first two elements (as interpreted in Bulldog Leasing Co. v. Curtis, 630 So. 2d 1060 (Fla.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 141 (1994)), but failed to meet the third requirement. Zurline, 642
So. 2d at 1170.
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B. Bulldog Remains the Big Dog on the Block
The standard set by the Supreme Court of Florida in Bulldog Leasing
Co. v. Curtis93 applies in all cases where the defendant asserts the seat
belt defense, and not only in cases where the plaintiff has possession or
control of the vehicle.'94 The Second District Court of Appeal in Osgood
Industries Inc. v. Schlau 95 applied the Bulldog test in its determination
that the trial court erred in granting its motion for directed verdict as to the
defendant's seat belt defense.19 6
C. It's Not What You Say, It's Where You Say It
Absolute immunity is afforded to any act which occurs during the
course of judicial proceedings, including the tortious interference with a
business relationship, so long as the act has some relation to the proceed-
ing." 7 Answering a question certified from the Eleventh Circuit, the
Supreme Court of Florida in Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayers
& Mitchell, P.A. v. United States Fire Insurance Co.98 extended the well-
established rule of absolute immunity, which traditionally applied only to
acts of slander, libel, perjury,' 99 and other tort claims. °  In so holding,
193. 630 So. 2d 1060 (Fla.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 141 (1994).
194. Osgood Indus. Inc. v. Schlau, 654 So. 2d 959, 961 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
see also Safety Kleen Corp. v. Ridley, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D842, D842 (1st Dist. Ct. App.
Apr. 6, 1995) (jury must be instructed that violation of § 316.614 constitutes evidence of
negligence).
195. 654 So. 2d at 959.
196. Id. at 961.
197. Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayers & Mitchell, P.A. v. United States
Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. 1994). The certified question which brought this
case to the court was:
WHETHER CERTIFYING TO A TRIAL COURT AN INTENT TO CALL
OPPOSING COUNSEL AS A WITNESS AT TRIAL IN ORDER TO OBTAIN
COUNSEL'S DISQUALIFICATION, AND LATER FAILING TO SUBPOENA
AND CALL COUNSEL AS A WITNESS AT TRIAL, IS AN ACTION THAT
IS ABSOLUTELY IMMUNE FROM A CLAIM OF TORTIOUS INTERFER-
ENCE WITH A BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP BY VIRTUE OF FLORIDA'S
LITIGATION PRIVILEGE.
Id.
198. Id. at 606.
199. This absolute immunity has its roots in several cases. See Fridovich v. Fridovich,
598 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1992) (quoting in part Levin, 639 So. 2d at 607) (holding defamatory
statements made in course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged, "no matter how
false or malicious the statements may be, so long as the statements are relevant to the subject
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the Supreme Court of Florida appears to have greatly extended the scope of
this immunity, again leaving the "[r]emedies for perjury, slander, and the
like committed during judicial proceedings ...to the discipline of the
courts, the bar association, and the state." ''
D. If You Sell It, Will They Come?
The mere hope of a plaintiff that some of its past customers may again
choose to buy from them cannot be a basis for a tortious interference claim.
The Supreme Court of Florida, in answering a certified question2 in
(holding immunity afforded to statemnents made during course of judicial proceeding extends
not only to parties in proceeding but to judges, witnesses, and counsel as well); Wright v.
Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding torts of perjury, libel,
slander, defamation, and similar proceedings that are based on statements made in connection
with judicial proceeding are not actionable); Sussman v. Damian, 355 So. 2d 809, 811 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (finding participants in judicial proceedings must be free from fear
of later civil liability as to anything said or written during litigation so as not to chill actions
of participants in immediate claim).
200. Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608. In the bad faith action, it was revealed that an attorney
with the plaintiff firm was one of the people who had knowledge of the defendant's alleged
bad faith. Id. at 607. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to disqualify the
plaintiff firm in which the defendant certified that it would be calling an attorney from that
firm as a witness at trial. Id. The defendant never called or subpoenaed that attorney at trial,
and never notified the court that it would not be calling that attorney. Id. After the trial, the
plaintiff firm sued the defendant for tortious interference with a business relationship,
alleging that the defendant intentionally disqualified the attorney to prevent the plaintiff's
firm from representing their client. Id, The defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that
its actions were protected by the absolute immunity afforded to statements or actions taken
during a judicial proceeding. Levin, 639 So. 2d at 607. The supreme court upheld the
dismissal. Id.; see also Ponzoli & Wassenberg, P.A. v. Zuckerman, 545 So. 2d 309, 310
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) (holding tortious claim of extortion, which was based on alleged
fraud and delaying tactics of counsel in course of litigation, was improper because conduct
at issue was committed during course of judicial proceeding and was immune from civil
liability in any subsequent proceeding), review denied, 554 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1989); Sailboat
Key, Inc. v. Gardner, 378 So. 2d 47, 49 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) ("injurious falsehood,
which is a tort that never has been greatly favored by the law, is subject to all the privileges
recognized both in cases of personal defamation and in those of other types of interference
with economic advantage") (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 114 (4th ed.
1971)).
201. Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608 (quoting Wright, 446 So. 2d at 1164).
202. The certified question before the supreme court was:
Under Florida law, in a tortious interference with business relationships tort
action, may a plaintiff recover damages for the loss of goodwill based upon
future sales to past customers with whom the plaintiff has no understanding that
they will continue to do business with the plaintiff, or is the plaintiffs recovery
40
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Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 203 held that a plaintiff may
not recover damages for the tortious interference with a business relation-
ship, where the relationship is based on speculation regarding future sales
to past customers.204  The court distinguished Insurance Field Services,
Inc. v. White & White Inspection & Audit Services, Inc., 5 because the
ongoing relationship that the tortfeasor interfered with there was "far
different" than in Georgetown, where there was a retail furniture dealer with
89,000 past customers." 6 The court thus held that, while Georgetown
could recover damages reasonably flowing from its existing relationships,
it could not recover for tortious interference based on a speculative
contention that past customers would return to purchase furniture.2°
E. If You're Finished, You May Be Done
Voluntary dismissal of an active tortfeasor with prejudice entered by
the agreement of parties pursuant to a settlement agreement is not the
equivalent of an adjudication on the merits"8 that will serve as a bar to
of damages limited to harm done to existing business relationships pursuant to
which plaintiff has legal rights... ?
Ethan Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So. 2d 812, 813 (Fla. 1994).
203. 47 F.3d 1099 (11th Cir. 1995).
204. Id. at 1101.
205. 384 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (company had regularly been
performing underwriting inspections, premiums, audits, and loss control work for 16
insurance company clients).
206. Georgetown, 47 F.3d at 1100 n.1. The case from which this question arose centers
around a dissolution of a business relationship between a manufacturer and its former dealer.
See Georgetown Manor Inc. v. Ethan Allen Inc., 991 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993).
During the dissolution of their relationship, the manufacturer placed an ad in a newspaper
which was the basis of the tortious interference claim. The advertisement announced the split
between the parties and related that manufacturer had discontinued distributing to dealer,
because dealer was not current on its debts. The ad also stated that manufacturer was
opening new outlets and asked those customers who had unfilled orders with dealer to
contact the new outlets where their orders would be filled expeditiously. The dealer then
brought suit claiming that the ad interfered with its prospective relationship with former
customers who had shopped with them in the past and might shop with them again in the
future. Id. at 1535-36.
207. Georgetown, 47 F.3d at 1101. As a general rule, an action for the tortious
interference with a business relationship requires a business relationship evidenced by an
actual and identifiable understanding or agreement which in all probability would have been
completed if there had not been interference. Ia
208. JFK Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Price, 647 So. 2d 833, 834 (Fla. 1994). In JFK, the
plaintiff sued her doctor (active tortfeasor) for medical malpractice. The suit included a
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continued litigation against the passive tortfeasor.2 9 The Supreme Court
of Florida in JFK Medical Center, Inc. v. Price also held that the voluntary
dismissal of the active tortfeasor would not affect the passive tortfeasor's
right to indemnification, reasoning that "[i]t would be unconscionable to
require a passive tortfeasor to compensate an injured party, while at the
same time barring indemnification from the active party. 210
F. An Interest(ing) Prejudgment Development
A successful personal injury claimant is entitled to prejudgment interest
on the claim from the time of the jury verdict to the entry of the final
judgment.2 In Palm Beach County School Board v. Montgomery,212
some six months after entry of the verdict, the trial court decided post trial
motions and entered a final judgment.23 The school board contested the
award of interest from the date of the verdict that was entered by the trial
court rather than from the date of the final judgment.214 The court applied
the analysis as set forth in the seminal case of Argonaut Insurance Co. v.
May Plumbing Co. 21 5 in awarding prejudgment interest on a personal
injury claim from the date of the rendition of the jury verdict up to the time
(with prejudice) against the doctor, but "the claim against the Center would not be affected."
Id. at 833. The trial court granted JFK'S motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
the dismissal of the physician operated as an adjudication on the merits. Id. at 833-34. The
district court reversed and JFK asked the supreme court to quash the lower court's decision.
Id. at 834.
209. Id.
210. JFK Medical Ctr., 647 So. 2d at 834.
211. Palm Beach County Sch. Bd. v. Montgomery, 641 So. 2d 183, 184 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1994).
212. 641 So. 2d at 183.
213. Id. at 184.
214. Id.
215. 474 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985). In Argonaut, the court established the following
principles:
1) An unliquidated claim becomes liquidated and susceptible of bearing prejudgment
interest when a jury verdict has the affect of fixing the amount of damages;
2) Once a verdict has liquidated damages as of a certain date, computation of pre-
judgment interest is merely a ministerial mathematical computation to be performed by the
court; and
3) Prejudgment interest is calculated at the same rate as postjudgment interest. Palm
Beach County Sch. Bd., 641 So. 2d at 184 (referring to Argonaut, 470 So. 2d at 215); see
also Sullivan v. McMillan, 19 So. 340, 342-43 (Fla. 1896) (holding person injured should
receive interest from time verdict liquidates damage claim).
Vol. 20
42
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 9
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/9
Mager
of entry of the final judgment. The court distinguished Zorn v. Britton216
which held that prejudgment interest would not be recoverable for personal
injuries, on the basis that the case was limited to "unliquidated damages for
personal injuries.' 217
G. Even an Attorney's Magic Won't Make 10 Equal 100
Under Florida's Wrongful Death Act, 218 a defendant cannot be
required to pay 100% of the damages where one of the parents of the
deceased child has been held to bear the majority of the fault.219 Defen-
dants can seek contribution despite the operation of the statute.220 In
Hudson v. Moss,22 the Third District Court of Appeal reasoned that the
policy underlying parent/child tort immunity disappears entirely in the
unfortunate case where the child has died and the parent is suing for their
own damages as a survivor,2" and found that requiring a third party
216. 162 So. 879 (Fla. 1935).
217. Palm Beach County Sch. Bd., 641 So. 2d at 184 (quoting Zorn, 162 So. at 881).
218. FLA. STAT. § 768.20 (1993) ("A defense that would bar or reduce a survivor's
recovery if he were the plaintiff may be asserted against him, but shall not affect the
recovery of any other survivor").
219. Hudson v. Moss, 653 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995). This issue
arose out of a wrongful death claim by the parents of a child drowning victim against the
owners of the swimming pool where the child drowned. Id. at 1072. The trial court held
the father to be 90% at fault for the child's drowning and held Larry and Sharon Hudson
each five percent at fault. Id. at 1072. The trial court allowed full recovery to the mother
by not reducing that amount by the percent of negligence attributed to the father. Id. The
trial court held that this result was clearly mandated based upon the interplay of the
Comparative Fault Act and the Wrongful Death Act of §§ 768.20, 768.71, and 768.81 of the
Florida Statutes. Id.
220. Hudson, 653 So. 2d at 1073. The appellate court found error in the trial court's
application of Joseph v. Quest, 414 So. 2d 1063, 1065 (Fla. 1982), which held that a
contribution claim for a child's damages against a negligent parent is allowed only to the
extent of the parent's liability insurance. Hudson, 653 So. 2d at 1073. Instead, the court
found that the reasoning of Shor v. Paoli, 353 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1977), was applicable to this
case. Hudson, 653 So. 2d at 1073. The court did agree with the extension of the Joseph
case that was adopted by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Johnson v. School Board,
537 So. 2d 685, 685-86 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989), which held that parent/child immunity
was not applicable to a contribution claim where the child was deceased and the parents were
suing for their own damages as survivors. Hudson, 653 So. 2d at 1073.
221. 653 So. 2d at 1071.
222. Id. (holding parent/child liability will deter parent from bringing action for damages
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tortfeasor to bear more than their proportionate share of liability unfairly
denied them their right to contribution.223
H. Doctors Medicate Hospital
In a case which could "open the door" to other similar avenues of
relief, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that doctors could sue
a hospital for damages that resulted from poor peer reviews.224
I. Expressing the Implied Covenant
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is gaining
recognition as a weapon against bad faith conduct by organizations which
are often in a superior bargaining position.225
223. Id.
224. Cooper v. Delaware Valley Medical Ctr., 654 A.2d 547, 551 (Pa. 1995).
225. This has been especially apparent in the franchise arena. With franchise litigation
on the rise, it is extremely important that both franchisors and franchisees (and their counsel)
be aware of the emerging theories based on the requirement of good faith and fair dealing
in contract performance.
One begins with the sentinel discussion as set out in Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 756
F. Supp. 543, 548-49 (S.D. Fla. 1991):
It is axiomatic that a contract includes not only its written provisions, but also
the terms and matters which, though not actually expressed, are implied by law,
and these are as binding as the terms which are actually written or spoken.
Sharp v. Williams, 141 Fla. 1, 192 So. 476, 480 (1939). One such implied term
of a contract, recognized by Florida law, is the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Fernandez v. Vazquez, 397 So. 2d 1171, 1174 (Fla. App.
1981) ("One established contract principle is that a party's good faith coopera-
tion is an implied condition precedent to performance of a contract"); Johnson
v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985) (seller of property has duty to disclose
material defects of which she is aware in accord with principles of fair dealing
and good faith).
Id. at 548-49; see also Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 798 F. Supp. 684 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
As the court similarly stated in Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 824
P.2d 841, 862 (Idaho 1992), in reiterating a particular jury instruction:
Every contract imposes on all partes to the contract an obligation of good faith
and fair dealing in its performance or enforcement. "Good faith" means honesty
in fact in the conduct or the transaction concerned. Each party owes a duty to
exercise good faith in its dealing and transactions with the other party. If a
party fails to deal honestly with the other party, it is liable for a breach of the
duty of good faith.
Id.; see also First Nationwide Bank v. Florida Software Servs., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1537, 1542
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (under Florida law, a party's good faith cooperation is an implied condition
precedent).
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This fundamental concept of good faith and fair dealing was also articulated by
renowned contract specialist Corbin:
If the purpose of contract law is to enforce the reasonable expectations of parties
induced by promises, then at some point it becomes necessary for courts to look
to the substance rather than the form of the agreement, and to hold that
substance controls over form. What courts are doing here, whether calling the
process "implication" of promises, or interpreting the requirements of "good
faith", as the current fashion may be, is but a recognition that the parties
occasionally have understandings or expectations that were so fundamental that
they did not need to negotiate about those expectations. When the court
"implies a promise" or holds that "good faith" requires a party not to violate
those expectations, it is recognizing that sometimes silence says more than [sic]
words, and it is understanding its duty to the spirit of the bargain is higher than
its duty to the technicalities of the language.
LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM & ARTHUR A. JACOBSON, CORBIN ON CONTRACrs § 570 (Supp.
1984).
Virtually every state agrees with this axiomatic principle. See, e.g., Dunkin' Donuts of
Am., Inc. v. Minerva, Inc., 956 F.2d 1566, 1569-70 (lth Cir. 1991) (holding under
Massachusetts law, "implied obligation of good faith exists by operation of law"); Louis
Glunz Beer, Inc. v. Martlet Importing Co., 864 F. Supp. 810, 817 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (applying
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contract and fraud action); Jo-Ann's
Launder Ctr. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 854 F. Supp. 387 (D.V.I. 1994); Peoples
Heritage Say. Bank v. Recoll Management, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 159, 166 (D. Me. 1993)
(finding that "[e]very contract or duty . . . imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement"); Union Say. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. North Cent. Life Ins. Co.,
813 F. Supp. 481, 489 (S.D. Miss. 1993) (holding that under Minnesota law, every non-saies
contract contains implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Metro Communications
Co. v. Ameritech Mobil Communications, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1424, 1431 (E.D. Mich. 1992)
(finding that "implied covenant attaches to every contract and 'imposes a limitation on the
exercise of discretion vested in one of the parties to a contract"'(quoting Dayan v.
McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958, 974 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984))), affd, 984 F.2d 739 (6th Cir.
1993); Zeno Buick-GMC, Inc. v. GMC Truck & Coach, 844 F. Supp 1340, 1348-50 (E.D.
Ark. 1992) (holding implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies under Michigan
common law), aff'd, 9 F.3d 115 (8th Cir. 1993); Colville Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. North Slope
Borough, 831 P.2d 341, 344 (Alaska 1992) ("In every contract . . . there is an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything which will injure
the right of the other . . ." (quoting Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1292 (Alaska 1979)));
McAlister v. Citibank, 829 P.2d 1253, 1259 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Traumann v. Southland
Corp., 858 F. Supp. 979, 983 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing applies, and "[e]ven where one party retains, by virtue of the contract, a right
of approval or disapproval or a discretionary power over the rights of the other, such powers
must be exercised 'within the parameters of the duty of good faith' ... good faith requires
that each party act 'reasonably' in light of the 'justified expectations' of the other party."
(quoting Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 791 F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987))); Ervin v. Amoco Oil Co., 885 P.2d 246, 250
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J. You Need a "Hickey" to Be Together
Two injuries arising out of two accidents may be joined together in a
suit as a matter of right where 1) the second accident contributed to the
injury from the first accident and 2) separate trials would create the risk of
inconsistent verdicts. In Hickey v. Pompano K of C,2 6 the Fourth District
Court of Appeal stated that if an injury sustained by a person while on one
property is later aggravated by an injury sustained on another person's
covenant of good faith); Wells Fargo Realty Advisors Funding, Inc. v. Uioli, Inc., 872 P.2d
1359, 1362 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (adding that Colorado has recognized separate cause of
action for bad faith breach of an insurance contract); Coraccio v. Lowell Five Cents Sav.
Bank, 612 N.E.2d 650, 655 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Katz v. Oak Indust., Inc., 508 A.2d 873,
880 (Del. Ch. 1986) (noting that "[miodern contract law has generally recognized an implied
covenant to the effect that each party to a contract will act with good faith towards the
other"); Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 824 P.2d 841, 862 (Idaho 1992);
Waller v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 620 A.2d 381, 387 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (implying
duty of good faith and fair dealing); Lemay Bank & Trust Co. v. Harper, 810 S.W.2d 690,
693 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Lachenmaier v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 803 P.2d 614, 617 (Mont.
1990) ("[e]very contract, regardless of type, contains an implied covenant of good faith...
• [B]reach of an express contractual term is not a prerequisite to breach of the implied cove-
nant." (quoting Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 775 (Mont. 1990))); Morris v. Bank
of Am. Nev., 886 P.2d 454, 457 (Nev. 1994) ("Where one party to a contract 'deliberately
countervenes the intention and spirit of the contract, that party can incur liability for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."' (quoting in part Hilton Hotels Corp.
v. Butch Lewis Prod. Inc., 808 P.2d 919, 922-23 (Nev. 1991))); Bak-A-Lum Corp. of Am.
v. Alcoa Bldg. Prod. Inc., 351 A.2d 349 (N.J. 1976) (applying implied covenant of good
faith); A.W. Fuir Co. v. Ataka & Co., Ltd., 422 N.Y.S.2d 419,422 (1979) (holding provision
giving "absolute and exclusive right to reject any order for any reason whatsoever" does not
give party right to arbitrarily refuse to perform); Richard Bruce & Co. v. J. Simpson & Co.,
243 N.Y.S.2d 503, 506 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (noting that "absolute discretion" means discretion
based on fair dealing and good faith-a reasonable discretion); Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul
Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (1933) (finding every contract contains an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Dull v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 354 S.E.2d 752
(N.C. Ct. App.), review denied, 358 S.E.2d 518 (N.C. 1987); Adolph Coors Co. v. Rodriguez,
780 S.W.2d 477, 481-83 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (concluding all contracts contain an implied
covenant of good faith); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Vinita v. Kissee, 859 P.2d 502, 509
(Okla. 1993) (holding implied covenant of good faith imposed upon all contracting parties
by common law); Nelson v. Web Water Dev. Ass'n, Inc., 507 N.W.2d 691, 697-98 (S.D.
1993); Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 300-01 (Utah App. 1994)
(upholding an award based on breach of implied covenant of good faith); Betchard-Clayton,
Inc. v. King, 707 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that "there is an implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed on the parties to a contract"); Lonsdale v.
Chesterfield, 662 P.2d 385, 387 (Wash. 1983) (finding implied covenant of good faith applies
to assignee of contract).
226. 647 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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property, those two claims can be joined in a suit against both property
owners.227 The court reasoned that if the cases are tried separately, the
jury in the first trial could hold that the damages resulted from the second
accident, and a subsequent jury in the second suit could determine that the
injuries resulting from the second accident were the result of the damages
from the first accident.2' A low verdict in both trials could thus be
entered which would not require a new trial. It would be highly unlikely
that a plaintiff would be able to get post-trial or appellate relief in these
circumstances, and therefore the plaintiff would not have an adequate
remedy by appeal. 9
227. Id. at 271. The plaintiff's complaint alleged claims against two defendants
resulting from separate slip and fall accidents occurring three weeks apart. Plaintiff alleges
that the first fall on A's premises injured her knee and made her more susceptible to falling
on B's premises and that the second fall aggravated her initial knee injury. To require her
to conduct separate trials against both defendants could result in inconsistent verdicts for
"which there would be no adequate remedy by appeal." Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.; see Lawrence v. Hethcox, 283 So. 2d 41, 44 (Fla. 1973) (holding joinder
required where plaintiff sued defendant for injuries sustained in auto accident and later
amended complaint to add second defendant involved in second accident about six weeks
later). The court so held because injuries from both accidents were overlapping and not
apportionable if the cases were tried separately and each defendant might be able to convince
the jury that the injuries were caused by the other defendant. Lawrence, 283 So. 2d at 44;
see also Pages v. Dominguez, 652 So. 2d 864, 867 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
consolidation of two brother's claims arising out of same accident was properly denied by
trial court because claims would require separate and distinct elements of damages and
testimony); Maharaj v. Grossman, 619 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Meyers v.
Shore Indus., Inc., 575 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991); U-Haul Co. of N. Fla., Inc.
v. White, 503 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986). In Kraft v. Smith, 148 P.2d 23 (Cal.
0"44), the court held the negligence of both defendants contributed approximately to cause
an injury for which a plaintiff was entitled to recover. Extreme difficulty of proof as to
amount each defendant was responsible requiredjoinder to prevent difficulties of proof which
tended to obstruct rather than promote justice arising from separate actions and separate in
such a situation. Iii at 26. With regard to an injury caused or contributed to by two or more
people, see McDonald v. Florida Department of Transportation, 655 So.2d 1164, 1168 (Fla.
4th Dist Ct. App. 1995) (holding intervening act will absolutely absolve original tortfeasor
of liability only when it is independent of original negligence and not set in motion by
original negligent act-two separate acts can be proximate cause of same injury; if injury is
caused by concurring negligence of two or more parties, each of them is liable to same extent
as if injury had been caused by each alone); Lovely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 658 A.2d 1091, 1092
(Me. 1995) (where single negligent actor, by aggravating a plaintiff's preexisting injury
produces aggregate injury that is incapable of apportionment, that negligent actor is liable
for plaintiffs entire amount of damages). The single injury rule, which was previously
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K. You're Liable to Be Liable
An attorney can be held liable for legal malpractice even where the
plaintiff is neither a client nor in privity of contract with the attorney.230
In Rushing v. Bosse,231 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the
special nature of an adoption proceeding permits a cause of action against
an attorney for professional negligence even in the absence of privity be-
tween the child and the attorney.232
apportionment, has been expanded.
230. Rushing v. Bosse, 652 So. 2d 869, 872-73 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Accord
Baskerville-Donovan Eng'rs, Inc. v. Pensacola House Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 581 So. 2d
1301, 1303 (Fla. 1991) (holding "lack of privity does not necessarily foreclose liability if a
duty of care is otherwise established"); Angel, Cohen & Rogovin, P.A. v. Oberon Inv., N.V.,
512 So. 2d 192, 193-94 (Fla. 1987) (finding limited exception to privity requirement where
plaintiff is intended third party beneficiary of attorney's actions); Greenberg v. Mahoney,
Adams & Criser, P.A., 614 So. 2d 604 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 624 So. 2d
267 (Fla. 1993); see also Meighan v. Shore, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 744, 754 (Ct. App. 1995)
(stating "in California, professional liability is not dependent upon privity of contract, but the
presence or absence of a client's intent that the plaintiff benefit from or rely upon the
attorney's services is particularly significant in the determination of duty. Intended reliance
may be express or implicit, obvious or subtle"); Brennan v. Ruffner, 640 So. 2d 143, 145-46
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding rule of privity in legal malpractice actions is relaxed
when plaintiff is intended third party beneficiary of contract between attorney and client);
Auric v. Continental Casualty Co., 331 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Wis. 1983) (holding beneficiary
of will may maintain legal malpractice action against attorney who negligently drafts or
supervises execution of will even though beneficiary is not in privity with attorney). Contra
Aglira v. Julien & Schlesinger, P.C., No. 55165, 1995 WL 567485, at "4 (N.Y. App. Div.
Sept. 21, 1995) (holding lack of privity between attorney and infant in medical malpractice
case prevents claim based on legal malpractice); C.K. Indus. Corp. v. C.M. Indus. Corp., 623
N.Y.S.2d 410, 411 (App. Div. 1995) (holding legal malpractice plaintiff must establish
existence of attorney-client relationship because in absence of fraud, collusion, malicious acts,
or other special circumstances, attorney is not liable for harm caused by professional
malpractice to third parties).
231. 652 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). The facts surrounding this decision
arose from the alleged misconduct of the attorneys who initiated and continued a private
adoption proceeding which resulted in the child being removed from her grandmother and
great-grandmother's care for ten months.
232. Id. at 872-73. Similarly, in Donahue v. Shughart, Thompson & Kilroy, P.C., 900
S.W.2d 624, 629 (Mo. 1995), the court held that the legal duty of attorneys to non-clients
must be determined by weighing the following six factors: 1) the existence of a specific
intent by the client that the purpose of the attorney's services was to benefit the plaintiffs;
2) the foreseeability of the harm to plaintiffs as a result of the attorney's negligence; 3) the
degree of certainty that the plaintiffs will suffer injury from attorney misconduct; 4) the
closeness of the connection between the attorney's conduct and the injury; 5) the policy of
preventing future harm; and 6) the burden on the profession of recognizing liability under
Vol. 20410
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that builder-developers and
their selling brokers may be held liable for failing to disclose to unwary
home buyers offsite conditions which will affect the value and enjoyment
of their new homes, which in this case were built near a hazardous waste
dump.2 33
M. If It's Damaged, It May Be Worth More
Courts, by upholding significant punitive damage awards, are showing
how they have become tired of defendants' lack of responsibility.234
the circumstances. In Duffey Law Office, S.C. v. Tank Transp., Inc., 535 N.W.2d 91, 92
(Wis. Ct. App. 1995), the court held that an attorney who represents to a client that the
attorney has expertise greater than that of the average lawyer is to be held to the standard
of professional care that is consistent with the claimed expertise.
233. Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420, 431 (N.J. 1995). The author expects this case
to launch a series of actions against real estate organizations, their brokers and other similarly
situated persons.
234. See, e.g., Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. Oxy USA Inc., 44 F.3d 1465, 1478
(10th Cir. 1995). In Continental, the court held that a punitive damages award of $30
million was not excessive, even in light of actual damage award being only $269,000. Id.
at 1479. "The jury apparently considered the wealth of the defendant ... in determining the
amount needed to punish and deter." Id. at 1478. Similarly, in Tiemey v. Community
Memorial General Hospital, 645 N.E.2d 284 (Ill. 1st Dist. App. Ct. 1994), the court held that
a $16 million award was not excessive in a medical malpractice case where the injuries were
substantial and the suffering was unique. Id. at 294. In Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd.,
888 P.2d 8 (Or. 1995), a punitive damages award of $5 million in a products liability action
was found to be within the range of what a rational jury would be entitled to award where
the defendant knew or should have known, before developing its product that it was likely
to cause death or serious bodily injury. Id. at 12. The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal, in Department of Transportation & Development v. Schwegmann Westside
Expressway, Inc., 651 So. 2d 1359 (La. 4th Cir. Ct. App. 1995), found a severance damages
award of $4.85 million was proper where the defendant's appropriation of land for public
purposes resulted in a loss of visibility and access to plaintiff's property and subsequently
a loss of value of plaintiff's property. Id. at 1364-65. In Koplewicz v. Colony Ticket
Service, Inc., 620 N.Y.S.2d 384, 384 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995), an award of $680,000 plus
attorney's fees, interest, and costs did not materially deviate from a reasonable award for a
fractured clavicle. In Duck Head Apparel Co. v. Hoots, 659 So. 2d 897 (Ala. 1995), a
further reduction of punitive damages award which had been reduced from $19.5 to $15
million was not supported by a consideration of the defendant's financial position. Id. at
915. In Williams v. Rene, 886 F. Supp. 1214 (D.V.I. 1995), an award of $4.5 million was
not excessive where an expert testified that the victim's economic damages could reach
almost $6 million. IeL at 1242. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Wagner v. City of
Chicago, 651 N.E.2d 1120, 1125 (III. 1995), upheld a $2.1 million award where the
49
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plaintiff's comparative negligence had already reduced the award and defendant had breached
its duty to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition. In Batiste v. New Hampshire
Insurance Co., 657 So. 2d 168 (La. Ct. App. 1995), an increase of the jury's damage award
to $250,000 was proper where the evidence showed that the victim suffered a 15% disability
of his body as a whole as a result of the accident. Id at 170. An award of $4.20 million
was held not to be excessive in Washington v. Barnes Hospital, 897 S.W.2d 611, 611 (Mo.
1995), where a child sustained severe and permanent brain damage as the result of negligent
care received immediately prior to and during delivery. Id. Similarly, in Luther v. Norfolk
& West Railway Co., 649 N.E.2d 1000, 1009 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), an award of over $1.57
million was not excessive for back injuries which aggravated a degenerative disc disease,
resulting in permanent injury and an inability to return to a past position as laborer, absent
any indication that the worker presented argument to inflame the passions or prejudices of
the jury. Id. at 1009. In Doe v. Doe, 657 So. 2d 628, 632 (La. Ct. App. 1995), the court
held an award of $750,000 was justified in light of a psychologist's sexual abuse of a patient
while the patient was in a severely depressed and suicidal state. Contra Chung v. New York
City Transit Auth., 624 N.Y.S.2d 224, 225 (App. Div. 1995) (holding award of $1.5 million
for past pain and suffering for plaintiff who, after falling from a subway platform lost both
legs, was excessive and a reduction to $600,000 was proper); Thibodeaux v. U.S.A.A.
Casualty Ins. Co., 647 So. 2d 351, 360-61 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (finding $90,000 award for
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